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The benefits of public-private collaborations for enhanced emergency 
management purposes are widely acknowledged, but the questions of when and how such 
collaborations would be most beneficial have been the subject of much debate. Arguably, 
it is at the preparedness stage that the private sector’s resources, innovative technologies 
and business continuity expertise can best be used to create more robust risk reduction 
and preparedness plans. Collaborations at this stage also provide for the identification and 
proper competitive procurement of all reasonably foreseeable emergency-related goods 
and services, rather than overuse of the emergency “no-bid” exception to competitive 
procurement, which can result in contractor fraud and government abuse. But, do the 
appropriate legal mechanisms exist to support increased collaborations? Given that the 
discussion surrounding such collaborations is still current, the assumption was that legal 
reform would be necessary. Using the Best Practice Research methodology, a review of 
the states’ procurement and emergency management laws actually reveals that they 
generally contain the necessary language to support increased public-private 
collaborations. But, some are more explicitly supportive of such collaborations than 
others. Accordingly, this thesis offers a statutory policy framework for agencies to 
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A robust emergency preparedness plan is necessary for an effective and 
successful emergency response and recovery effort following a disaster or emergency 
event, whether natural or man-made. The public sector has long recognized the 
importance of interstate and intrastate collaborative relationships to supply the necessary 
goods, resources and services when the needs of a devastated community are beyond 
what its government can provide.1 The NRF has made it clear, though, that 
“[g]overnment resources alone cannot meet all of the needs of those affected by major 
disasters.”2 Rather, for an emergency management plan to be most effective, from 
preparedness through recovery, all stakeholders, both public and private, must take an 
active role.3  
The concept of public-private collaborations in the specific context of emergency 
management is not new. Scholars are largely in agreement as to the benefits of 
collaborating with the private sector, citing its abundant resources, business continuity 
and supply chain management expertise as well as its innovative technologies.4 The 
question that necessarily arises is at what stage would such collaborations work best? 
This thesis makes the argument that it is at the emergency preparedness stage that greater 
public-private collaborations would be most beneficial. It is during this planning stage 
where the risk assessment data is collected, reviewed and analyzed, and plans, procedures 
                                                 
1 “Preparedness,” FEMA, accessed January 28, 2016, https://www.fema.gov/national-preparedness. 
2 United States Department of Homeland Security, National Response Framework, 2nd ed. 
(Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Homeland Security), 4, accessed January 28, 2016, 
http://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/20130726-1914-25045-1246/final_national_response_ 
framework_20130501.pdf.  
3 United States Department of Homeland Security, National Response Framework, 26; 
“Preparedness.” 
4 John Copenhaver, “Integrating the Private Sector in Homeland Security Preparation and Response,” 
in A Legal Guide to Homeland Security and Emergency Management for State and Local Governments, ed. 
Ernest B. Abbott and Otto J. Hetzel (Chicago: ABA Publishing, 2005), 250; Jeremiah Jones, “Privatization 
of Disaster Preparedness: Increasing Resilience through Planning,” in The Private Sector’s Role in 
Disasters: Leveraging the Private Sector in Emergency Management, ed. Alessandra Jerolleman and John 
J. Kiefer (Boca Raton: Taylor & Francis Group, LLC, 2016), 99; Takako Izumi and Rajib Shaw, 
“Overview and Introduction of the Private Sector’s Role in Disaster Management,” in Disaster Risk 
Reduction: Methods, Approaches and Practices, ed. Takako Izumi and Rajib Shaw (Japan: Springer, 2015), 
3. 
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and strategies are developed and integrated into a cohesive emergency management 
protocol.5 It is also at this stage that emergency managers are charged with identifying 
those goods and services that must be procured, and engaging in the competitive 
procurement process, as required by law, to ensure that all reasonably foreseeable goods 
and services are in place well before a disaster occurs.6 Generally, all states have 
legislatively recognized the important role the private sector plays in all phases of 
emergency management. Some states, however, are much more express and explicit in 
this recognition, which arguably provides a more sound foundation to support the 
increased public-private collaborations advocated in this thesis. 
As stated, as part of an effective emergency management policy, it is critical for 
the government to obtain the “best emergency product” for the “best price” in enough 
time to meet the disaster or emergency.7 To do so, officials must utilize the competitive 
procurement process, and all states’ procurement laws generally recognize this 
requirement. Importantly, though, states also include an emergency “no-bid” exception to 
competitive procurement when “prompt purchases become necessary for health and 
safety reasons.”8 The danger associated with this exception arises from its overuse or 
improper use, which can render a jurisdiction vulnerable to inflated prices, contractor 
exploitation as well as lead to the opportunity for government abuse.9 While such an 
exception is admittedly necessary to protect citizens in an emergency situation when an 
unforeseen circumstance is present and an unanticipated good or service is required, it 
should be clearly legislatively relegated to a procurement method of last resort so as to 
minimize the potential for abuse to the greatest extent possible. Proper use of the 
competitive procurement method also allows time to enter into a negotiated contract, 
                                                 
5 United States Department of Homeland Security, National Response Framework, 24. 
6 Jude Egan and Thomas Anderson, “Considerations for a Model of Public-Private Sector 
Collaboration in the Provision of Disaster Relief: Incentives and Limits,” in Emergency Management and 
Disaster Response Utilizing Public-Private Partnerships, ed. Marvine Paula Hamner et al. (Hershey: IGI 
Global, 2015), 8. 
7 La. Admin. Code tit. 34, pt. V, §1109 (West, Westlaw through rules published in the Louisiana 
Register dated November 20, 2015). 
8 Karl Oakes, J.D., “Competitive Bidding,” 73A C.J.S. Public Contracts §15 (June 2015). 
9 Jessie Schultz and Tina Søreide, “Corruption in Emergency Procurement,” Disasters 32, no. 4 (May 
2008): 518–19, accessed January 28, 2016, doi:10.1111/j.0361-3666.2008.01053.x.  
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which will further protect a jurisdiction from the potential vulnerabilities that a “no-bid” 
situation incites by offering clear delineations of the responsibilities and oversight tasks 
of each of the parties, thereby ensuring accountability.10 Integrating private-sector 
expertise at the preparedness stage and creating an emergency management protocol that 
is built on the expertise of both public and private-sector representatives will allow 
agencies to best plan for potential emergency events in accordance with competitive 
procurement law, and to provide citizens with thoughtful and well-researched emergency 
management initiatives. 
Despite the seemingly overwhelming positive implications associated with public-
private collaborations, scholars have noted the skepticism associated with the 
privatization of traditional governmental functions.11 Such skepticism is primarily based 
on issues regarding ultimate accountability for preparedness and response efforts as well 
as the motives of the private sector in fulfilling governmental functions.12 Critics have 
argued that privatization essentially allows private companies to use public resources for 
their own ends, as opposed to the benefit of the general public.13 The counterargument to 
this skepticism is that the two are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Both governmental 
agencies and the private sector have the same end goal: the continuity of operations.14 By 
taking advantage of the private sector’s resources, efficient business operations, 
technologies and expertise, the government can provide its citizens with the best 
emergency management initiatives that would not otherwise be available. Also, this 
thesis is not advocating for the wholesale transfer of emergency management to private 
companies; rather, simply an increased effort to collaborate with and reap the benefits of 
the private sector. 
                                                 
10 Donald F. Kettl, “The Job of Government: Interweaving Public Functions and Private Hands,” 
Public Administration Review 75, no. 2 (March/April 2015): 220, accessed January 11, 2016, doi:10.1111/
puar.12336. 
11 Kevin Fox Gotham, “Disaster, Inc.: Privatization and Post-Katrina Rebuilding in New Orleans,” 
Perspectives on Politics 10, no. 03 (September 2012): 634, accessed January 28, 2016, doi:10.1017/
S153759271200165X.  
12 Ibid., 634–35. 
13 Ibid., 635. 
14 Copenhaver, “Integrating the Private Sector in Homeland Security Preparation and Response,” 253. 
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While some agencies have already integrated the private sector to a certain extent 
in their emergency management initiatives, this thesis makes the argument that more can 
be done, based on the fact that the currently existing emergency management laws 
generally allow for such increased integration. Moreover, scholars have noted the 
increased trend of government agencies filling the role of a “manager” or “administrator” 
of contracts, as opposed to the “provider” of goods and services.15 
Based on the foregoing, this thesis ultimately makes three policy 
recommendations. First, the private sector should be a true emergency management 
partner with governmental agencies and should occupy a seat, if not several seats, on the 
various agencies’ emergency management committee(s). These seats would ideally be 
filled through the competitive procurement process pursuant to which certain factors such 
as past emergency experience, proposed emergency-related solutions and prior record of 
performance would be considered. Second, the emergency “no-bid” exception should 
truly be made a procurement method of last resort. By implementing more robust 
emergency preparedness and management initiatives through public-private 
collaborations, governmental agencies will be able to forecast with a great deal of 
precision the goods and services that will become necessary for response efforts, and will 
be able to competitively procure those goods and services in a sufficient amount of time 
prior to the disaster event. Third, to support the foregoing recommendations, this thesis 
sets forth certain emergency management statutory or policy provisions that more 
expressly integrate the private sector, which are based on the “best of” the states’ laws 
which are currently in place. These provisions can be adopted in whole or in part and 
integrated into the states’ respective currently existing statutory or policy frameworks, to 
the extent desired and feasible. The goal of this thesis is to provide a framework of 
options and considerations to enable any agency to enhance its emergency preparedness 
and management initiatives by making use of all available resources to the greatest 
degree possible well before the disaster occurs. 
 
                                                 
15 John Adler, Dugan Petty, and Rebecca Randall, “Public Procurement: Past, Present and Future,” 
The Council of State Governments (2006): 451, accessed January 28, 2016, http://knowledgecenter.csg.org/
kc/system/files/Adler_Article.pdf. 
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I. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
A sound, well-researched and wide-reaching emergency preparedness plan is the 
key to effective emergency management. An essential component of such a preparedness 
plan is the identification and execution of necessary collaborative and mutual aid 
agreements to augment otherwise limited governmental resources. The major overarching 
mutual aid emergency response framework currently in place is the national 
interjurisdictional compact, EMAC, which provides a federally declared clear and 
uniform response structure for governor-declared states of emergency. But, application of 
this federal standard alone in emergency preparedness plans does not encompass all 
reasonably foreseeable response mechanisms and types of disasters. To begin, it is not 
“activated” and, thus, does not apply to every disaster that may occur, only to governor-
declared states of emergency. Moreover, it only addresses assistance and resource-
sharing initiatives during disasters, as opposed to “pre-disaster” preparedness initiatives. 
Finally, and, most notably, it only governs interjurisdictional (public sector) assistance, 
and does not govern public-private collaborations. The increased role of the private sector 
in all phases of emergency management but, most importantly, in the preparedness stage, 
can fill these gaps and, in fact, enhance governmental entities’ emergency preparedness 
and management plans and response efforts. 
Private entities have significant resources, access to cutting-edge innovations, and 
business continuity and supply chain management expertise that could serve to greatly 
benefit public agencies and their citizens in disaster events. Indeed, governmental 
agencies at the federal, state and local levels have become increasingly aware of the 
benefits that the private sector can provide to public safety agencies during all phases of 
emergency management, and states have statutorily provided general permissibility to 
enter into partnerships in that regard. Yet, some state and local governments fail to take 
full advantage of these private resources. Why? Much of the research conducted suggests 
that the idea of the privatization of certain governmental functions is still held at arms’ 
length by some entities, as it triggers issues of ultimate accountability and liability for 
emergency preparedness and response as well as issues of transparency of governmental 
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action. This hesitation could cause agencies to miss opportunities to take advantage of the 
private sector’s resources and expertise during the initial stages of emergency planning 
activities, despite the flexible statutory language available to support such collaborations. 
An additional consideration is the fact that while the states’ various statutory provisions 
that comprise their procurement and emergency management laws are permissive with 
regard to public-private collaborations, certain local governments have ordinances or 
local laws in place prohibiting them from taking advantage of what state law otherwise 
allows, such as multi-award and cooperative purchasing contracts. 
Consequently, this thesis will 1) investigate the argument for increased public-
private collaborations from the public agency perspective, while also considering the 
concerns that private entities may have in forming such partnerships; 2) analyze the 
relevant state procurement and emergency management laws to determine whether and to 
what extent those laws support public-private collaborations; and 3) propose a “best 
practices” policy, which shall be based on a collection of the most supportive statutory 
language currently in force among the states. This policy may be used by public agencies 
to augment their currently existing emergency management frameworks to enhance their 
respective abilities to contract with private vendors “pre-disaster” to supplement what the 
government alone cannot provide during and after a disaster, to the extent they are not 
already doing so to their greatest advantage. 
A. RESEARCH QUESTION 
The main research question addressed in this thesis is: Should there be a national 
framework, “best practices” policy or statutory reform on a state-by-state basis with 
regard to the competitive procurement of goods and services for emergency preparedness 
and management, which would provide a mechanism for increased public-private 
collaborations to ensure that each jurisdiction is as prepared as possible prior to a disaster 
or emergency event and/or can more easily obtain unanticipated but necessary goods and 
services in the midst of a dynamic emergency event?  
There are several sub-questions that inevitably arise in connection with this 
overarching question that are also addressed in this thesis: 1) How well do the states’ 
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procurement and emergency management laws allow for public-private collaborations in 
an emergency situation, if at all? 2) Can or should these laws be revised to provide for 
greater public-private collaborations? 3) Should there be a federal or national standard, 
framework or policy from which each of the states can reform their respective policies or 
laws to allow for the greatest use of resources to enhance emergency preparedness and 
management efforts? 
B. LITERATURE REVIEW  
This thesis focused, in part, on the actual statutory language in force in each of the 
states to identify the current procurement and emergency management mechanisms in 
order to determine 1) what kind of reform is actually needed, if any, and 2) whether one 
or more states has a framework that supports public-private collaborations that can be 
used as a model. Accordingly, there is no “literature” regarding the precise statutory 
language apart from the pertinent interpretative case law, the most relevant of which is 
cited in this thesis for reference.  
The academic literature on this topic addresses the impact of public-private 
collaborations on emergency preparedness and management efforts, and the most 
representative of these viewpoints is set forth below. The literature reviewed discusses 
the need for increased public-private collaborations, but also acknowledges the potential 
drawbacks and pitfalls attendant such collaborations. Of particular note is the literature’s 
consideration of the theory of privatization, and the fact that some government entities 
are hesitant to “contract out” traditional government functions to private companies. 
Nonetheless, to the extent these collaborations are formed, the literature reviewed focuses 
on the importance of memorializing these partnerships by way of formal contractual 
agreements to ensure that the unique needs of the governmental entity are met, and to 
ensure the accountability of each of the parties. But, the literature also acknowledges the 
arguments for and against formal contracts, especially in the context of a dynamic 
emergency environment. Lastly, the literature discusses the role of the private sector 
beyond that of simply a provider of emergency-related goods and services, and considers 
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the concept of the private sector as a true partner with the government throughout the 
entire emergency management enterprise, from planning through recovery. 
1. Public-Private Collaborations 
EMAC provides for mutual assistance between and among the states to provide 
various necessary resources in the event of governor-declared states of emergency. 
Kapucu, Augustin and Garayev label EMAC as “the cornerstone of national mutual 
aid.”1 Additionally, both Stier and Goodman as well as Lynn recognize that this mutual 
aid, along with increased regional cooperation, can alleviate budgetary concerns for 
governmental agencies and enable them to better provide needed resources to citizens in 
response to an emergency situation.2 It is suggested, though, that these cross-
jurisdictional mutual aid agreements are not enough. Stewart, Kolluru and Smith argue 
for greater preparedness collaborations by highlighting the fact that the consequences of 
disasters essentially exploit the interdependency of the public and private sectors, and 
expose the resultant vulnerabilities.3 Kapucu, Arslan and Collins argue that collaboration 
between the public and private sectors allows for the blending of the public 
accountability of government with the “market-driven” strategies of the private sector to 
create relationships to better prepare for catastrophes.4 Urby and McEntire also point to 
the advantages of applying the market-based operations of the private sector to provide 
                                                 
1 Naim Kapucu, Maria-Elena Augustin, and Vener Garayev, “Interstate Partnerships in Emergency 
Management: Emergency Management Assistance Compact in Response to Catastrophic Disasters,” Public 
Administration Review 69, no. 2 (March/April 2009): 300, accessed February 19, 2016, doi:10.1111/j.1540-
6210.2008.01975.x. 
2 Daniel D. Stier, J.D. and Richard A. Goodman, M.D., J.D., MPH, “Mutual Aid Agreements: 
Essential Tools for Public Health Preparedness and Response,” American Journal of Public Health 
Supplement 1, 97, no. S1 (2007): S62, accessed January 28, 2016, doi:10.2105/AJPH.2006.101626; Phil 
Lynn, “Mutual Aid: Multijurisdictional Partnerships for Meeting Regional Threats,” New Realities: Law 
Enforcement in the Post-9/11 Era, NCJ 210679, United States Department of Justice, Office of Justice 
Programs, Bureau of Justice Assistance (September 2005): 5, accessed February 22, 2016, 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/bja/210679.pdf. 
3 Geoffrey T. Stewart, Ramesh Kolluru, and Mark Smith, “Leveraging Public-Private Partnerships to 
Improve Community Resilience in Times of Disaster,” International Journal of Physical Distribution and 
Logistics Management 39, no. 5 (2009): 344, accessed January 28, 2016, doi:10.1108/
09600030910973724. 
4 Naim Kapucu, Tolga Arslan, and Matthew Lloyd Collins, “Examining Intergovernmental and 
Interorganizational Response to Catastrophic Disaster: Toward a Network-Centered Approach,” 
Administration and Society 42, no. 2 (2010): 228, accessed January 28, 2016, doi:10.1177/
0095399710362517. 
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the community with the best products for the best prices, and taut that this can best be 
achieved through horizontal collaborative relationships.5 Kapucu, Arslan and Collins 
agree that “[d]isasters create an atmosphere wherein organizations from different sectors 
feel the shared risk and willingly coordinate their shared responsibilities.”6 
Busch and Givens state that governments can benefit from the private sector’s 
ability to conduct business with greater efficiency and to provide greater financial 
resources toward emergency preparedness initiatives and technological innovations.7 
Jones specifically notes that public agencies simply do not have the necessary resources, 
technology or expertise to identify and implement all reasonably foreseeable emergency 
preparedness and management plans.8 Copenhaver agrees that the private sector must be 
included in the emergency preparedness as well as the response stages.9  
Other research, such as that conducted by Prager, casts doubt on these arguments 
in favor of private-sector integration, and suggests that while the government does not 
have a profit-driven bottom-line motivator, incentives such as “[p]ower, prestige and 
‘public service’” can drive governmental efficiency, if such efficiency is supported by 
the agency.10  Prager emphasizes that the ability of private firms to enhance the 
efficiency of governmental initiatives is dependent upon the management and operational 
structure of the private entity, and whether that structure is conducive to efficient 
output.11 Prager also brings to light a perspective not considered by the other scholars, 
                                                 
5 Heriberto Urby, Jr. and David A. McEntire, “Applying Public Administration in Emergency 
Management: The Importance of Integrating Management into Disaster Education,” Homeland Security 
and Emergency Management 11, no. 1 (2014): 54, 56, accessed January 11, 2016, doi:10.1515/jhsem-2013-
0060. 
6 Kapucu, Arslan, and Collins, “Examining Intergovernmental and Interorganizational Response to 
Catastrophic Disaster,” 229. 
7 Nathan E. Busch and Austen D. Givens, “Public-Private Partnerships in Homeland Security: 
Opportunities and Challenges,” Homeland Security Affairs 8, art. 18 (October 2012): 6–7, accessed 
February 19, 2016, https://www.hsaj.org/articles/233. 
8 Jones, “Privatization of Disaster Preparedness,” 99. 
9 Copenhaver, “Integrating the Private Sector in Homeland Security Preparation and Response,” 250. 
10 Jonas Prager, “Contracting Out Government Services: Lessons from the Private Sector,” Public 
Administration Review 54, no. 2 (March-April 1994): 179, accessed January 28, 2016, http://www.jstor.org/
stab le/976527. 
11 Ibid., 180. 
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namely, that perhaps public-private collaborations are simply a “second-best option” 
because there is “a lack of political will to establish efficiency as a high-level priority of 
government operations” thus making such collaborations necessary.12 VanWagner, 
however, offers a counter-position to Prager’s argument and posits that the government’s 
need to reduce costs actually drives the increased efficiency of the private sector for the 
benefit of the government in that private companies will be more motivated to create new 
products to enhance effectiveness and affordability for governmental use.13 
Further questioning the efficacy of the public-private collaborative scheme, 
Kapucu, Arslan and Demiroz make the argument that such collaborations are not 
overwhelmingly advantageous in the particular circumstance of a dynamic emergency 
situation in which decisions need to be made in a rapid manner.14 As is discussed more 
fully in this thesis, their research also suggests that developing a formal collaborative 
mechanism, such as a contract, that governs the relationship can serve to offset this 
concern as well as support a long-term partnership in which each side develops habits of 
working together efficiently.15 Interestingly, two of the three authors in the preceding 
article, Kapucu and Arslan, collaborated with Collins and lauded the particular efficiency 
of the private sector in response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, respectively, in 2005, 
and posited that the necessary resources were only able to be provided to Gulf Coast 
residents as a result of the efficient business and management structure of private firms.16  
Gotham, however, decries the concept of expanded privatization in the context of 
emergency management, stating that “privatization obscures liability and accountability 
for problematic post-disaster outcomes,” and allows private entities “to use public 
                                                 
12 Prager, “Contracting Out Government Services,” 180. 
13 Kimberly VanWagner, “Privatization of Some Emergency Management Functions–Case Study:  
Innovative of Fraudulent?: The Role of Private Contractors in Post-Disaster Cleanup,” in The Private 
Sector’s Role in Disasters: Leveraging the Private Sector in Emergency Management, ed. Alessandra 
Jerolleman and John J. Kiefer (Boca Raton: Taylor & Francis Group, LLC, 2016),  29. 
14 Naim Kapucu, Tolga Arslan, and Fatih Demiroz, “Collaborative Emergency Management and 
National Emergency Management Network,” Disaster Prevention and Management 19, no. 4 (2010): 458, 
accessed January 28, 2016, doi:10.1108/09653561011070376. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Kapucu, Arslan, and Collins, “Examining Intergovernmental and Interorganizational Response to 
Catastrophic Disaster,” 231, 240. 
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resources and power to achieve what are essentially private aims.”17 Busch and Givens, 
though, offer the counterargument that by contracting out some governmental services, 
such as evacuations and food stations, to private firms, governmental agencies can focus 
on more strategic planning initiatives, which would better serve the public.18 The 
research, thus, suggests that greater use of private-sector resources can increase the 
effectiveness of governmental response to disasters and provide greater and more 
efficient emergency management initiatives for the benefit of citizens.   
In espousing the advantages of public-private collaborations, Busch and Givens, 
as well as others, do not seem to account for or address the impact of the competitive 
selection process mandated by state procurement laws. They argue that private-sector 
consultants can be hired quickly for project-specific tasks and either discharged once the 
tasks are completed or kept on for other projects.19 This argument ignores the constraints 
governmental agencies are under to comply with state and local statutes and ordinances, 
respectively, that require a competitive selection process before a private vendor can be 
retained. Indeed, notably absent from much of the research reviewed is the 
acknowledgment of state competitive selection requirements and how and/or whether 
emergency procurement practices fit in with such requirements, as well as the impact of 
those practices on the ability of governmental agencies to contract with private vendors. 
In one of the only identified articles to address this point, McEntire and Myers recognize 
the need for preparedness planning and the development of “pre-disaster” contracts to 
ensure that all necessary resources are in place prior to an emergency event, and to also 
ensure that the government is getting the best available price for the goods and services, 
as opposed to an emergency “no-bid” procurement that could result in price-gouging and 
exploitation.20 Schultz and Søreide agree, finding that the urgency associated with 
                                                 
17 Gotham, “Disaster, Inc.: Privatization and Post-Katrina Rebuilding in New Orleans,” 635. 
18 Nathan E. Busch and Austen D. Givens, “Achieving Resilience in Disaster Management: The Role 
of Public-Private Partnerships,” Journal of Strategic Security 6, no. 2, art. 1 (Summer 2013): 5, accessed 
February 19, 2016, doi:10.5038/1944-0472.6.2.1. 
19 Ibid., 6. 
20 David A. McEntire and Amy Myers, “Preparing Communities for Disasters: Issues and Processes 
for Government Readiness,” Disaster Prevention and Management 13, no. 2 (March 2004): 146, accessed 
January 28, 2016, doi:10.1108/09653560410534289. 
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emergency situations “decreases bargaining power” and that resultant “rapid procurement 
is particularly prone to inflated prices and expenditures.”21 
2. Public-Private Collaborations at the Emergency Preparedness Stage 
The research reviewed is largely in agreement that public-private collaborations 
for emergency management are beneficial. The academic discourse on this issue has 
focused more on the stage at which such collaborations would be most advantageous. 
Kiefer notes that the mitigation stage is the most advantageous as it is the economic 
stability of a community that will dictate its ability to recover, and that stability depends 
on overall risk reduction.22 Bharania agrees, stating that “[t]he private sector has…a 
vested interest in seeing the timely recovery of disaster-affected communities.”23 Klima 
and Jerolleman further cite the need for public and private-sector representatives from a 
variety of disciplines to contribute to the hazard mitigation effort in order to provide a 
more unified and coherent approach to risk reduction.24 The NRF advocates for the 
integration of the private sector “before an incident occurs” in order to ensure that the 
necessary assistance and support services are available for the response and recovery 
phases.25 Likewise, the NIMS’ National Preparedness System recognizes that while 
emergencies and preparedness efforts affect the whole community, preparedness plans 
must include the whole community, public and private-sector representatives alike.26 On 
the other hand, Chen et al., suggest that the recovery phase is when this type of 
collaboration is most effective, as the local partners have the unique local knowledge and 
                                                 
21 Schultz and Søreide, “Corruption in Emergency Procurement,” 518. 
22 John J. Kiefer, “Recent Trends in Emergency Management,” in The Private Sector’s Role in 
Disasters: Leveraging the Private Sector in Emergency Management, ed. Alessandra Jerolleman and John 
J. Kiefer (Boca Raton: Taylor & Francis Group, LLC, 2016), 7. 
23 Rakesh Bharania, “Using Expert Networking Knowledge to Assist Communities in Crisis 
Resilience,” in The Role of Business in Disaster Response: A Business Civic Leadership Center Report, 
United States Chamber of Commerce (2012): 31, accessed January 28, 2016, 
https://www.uschamberfoundation.org/sites/default/files/publication/ccc/
Role%20of%20Business%20in%20Disaster%20Response.pdf. 
24 Kelly Klima and Alessandra Jerolleman, “Bridging the Gap: Hazard Mitigation in the Global 
Context,” Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management 11, no. 2 (June 2014): 2, accessed 
January 29, 2016, doi:10.1515/jhsem-2013-0095.  
25 United States Department of Homeland Security, National Response Framework, 26. 
26 “Preparedness.” 
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resources that will be able to rebuild the community and most effectively respond to the 
residual effects befalling that community after a disaster, both social and economic.27 
With regard to the locality aspect of this argument, Gerber and Robinson have 
criticized local governments for failing to be more proactive in their emergency 
preparedness efforts.28 In fact, Schultz and Søreide note that “corruption occurs because 
procurement specialists are ignorant of the local market dynamics.”29 Kapucu, Arslan 
and Collins also note that local jurisdictions are able to respond more quickly to disasters 
and should be prepared accordingly.30 Perry and Lindell are in agreement regarding the 
ability of local governments to be more attuned to local circumstances, needs and 
capabilities.31 In addition, MacManus and Caruson point out that “[l]ocal officials are 
well aware of the fact that they will be held the most accountable for responses to 
disaster-related incidents because constituents often have little knowledge of which level 
of government is primarily responsible for the delivery of specific services.”32   
3. Advantages of Collaborating with the Private Sector: Business 
Continuity and Supply Chain Management Expertise 
As many scholars have noted, one of the prime advantages for the public sector in 
partnering with private-sector entities is the public sector’s ability to share in and reap the 
benefits of a private company’s business continuity plan. Busch and Givens specifically 
highlight the substantial assistance that Wal-Mart was able to provide post-Katrina in the 
                                                 
27 Justine Chen et al., “Public-Private Partnerships for the Development of Disaster Resilient 
Communities,” Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management 21, no. 3 (September 2013): 132, 
accessed January 28, 2016, doi:10.1111/1468-5973.12021. 
28 Brian J. Gerber and Scott E. Robinson, “Local Government Performance and the Challenges of 
Regional Preparedness for Disasters,” Public Performance and Management Review 32, no. 3 (March 
2009): 354, accessed February 19, 2016, doi:10.2753/Pmr1530-9576320301. 
29 Schultz and Søreide, “Corruption in Emergency Procurement,” 527. 
30 Kapucu, Arslan, and Collins, “Examining Intergovernmental and Interorganizational Response to 
Catastrophic Disaster,” 239. 
31 Ronald W. Perry and Michael K. Lindell, “Preparedness for Emergency Response: Guidelines for 
the Emergency Planning Process,” Disasters 27, no. 4 (December 2003): 339, accessed January 28, 2016, 
doi:10.1111/j.0361-3666.2003.00237.x. 
32 Susan A. MacManus and Kiki Caruson, “Financing Homeland Security and Emergency 
Preparedness: Use of Interlocal Cost-Sharing,” Public Budgeting and Finance 28, no. 2 (Summer 2008): 
63, accessed January 28, 2016, doi:10.1111/j.1540-5850.2008.00905.x. 
 10 
face of governmental resource gaps.33 Wong discusses the assistance that Office Depot 
provides to businesses during disasters through its “in-house” disaster preparedness and 
recovery division.34 Kapucu, Arslan and Demiroz suggest that given that supply chain 
management and business continuity are essentially the business of large national and 
international chains, the “private sector should have more opportunity and responsibility 
to provide resources for response and recovery operations.”35 In fact, Stewart, Kolluru 
and Smith refer to supply chain management as a key component to the community 
resilience framework advocated in their article in that it highlights the interconnectedness 
of all agencies and entities in responding to and recovering from an emergency 
situation.36  
Busch and Givens take this argument a step further and suggest that private firms 
should partner with the public sector from the policy-making stage to better assist in 
emergency preparedness efforts, such as in the creation of emergency plans.37 They 
suggest that private businesses can advise the particular governmental agency of all of its 
own needs, which can then be built into a wider emergency planning framework.38 Of 
course, this is not to say that public agencies do not have their own emergency planning 
committees, emergency managers and like officials to determine a government’s and its 
community’s respective needs and plan accordingly. Rather, this thesis allows for the 
reality that there is no guarantee that government emergency managers can plan and 
prepare for every possible need, every piece of equipment or service or all necessary 
personnel to sufficiently respond to and recover from the many possible disaster or 
emergency situations, and considers that a sound preparedness initiative involves all 
                                                 
33 Busch and Givens, “Public-Private Partnerships in Homeland Security,” 3, 6. 
34 Mary Wong, “Talking About Preparedness: Leave No Stone Unturned,” in The Role of Business in 
Disaster Response: A Business Civic Leadership Center Report, United States Chamber of Commerce 
(2012): 7, accessed January 28, 2016, https://www.uschamberfoundation.org/sites/default/files/publication/
ccc/Role%20of%20Business%20in%20Disaster%20Response.pdf. 
35 Kapucu, Arslan, and Demiroz, “Collaborative Emergency Management and National Emergency 
Management Network,” 455. 
36 Stewart, Kolluru, and Smith, “Leveraging Public-Private Partnerships to Improve Community 
Resilience in Times of Disaster,” 350. 
37 Busch and Givens, “Achieving Resilience in Disaster Management,” 12–13. 
38 Ibid., 13. 
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stakeholders, both public and private, which reinforces the more effective “whole 
community” recovery effort.39 
4. Private Sector Disadvantages of Public-Private Collaborations 
One concern cited by the research against public-private collaborations is the idea 
of transparency that is necessary for governmental agencies, but not the private sector. By 
agreeing to do business with the government, private entities are essentially agreeing to 
open their books and business practices, to a certain extent, for public viewing. Busch 
and Givens, as well as Schaffer and Loveridge, point out that such transparency may put 
that private business at a disadvantage in the competitive business market if certain 
information, like its price points, are publicly disclosed for all to see and for competitors 
to under-bid.40 Busch and Givens also cite the financial disincentives for private firms in 
doing business with the government, given that it is based on a low-bid structure.41 
Pongsiri further cautions that private firms may be hesitant to enter into business 
relationships with governmental agencies if governmental regulation of private activities 
is not clearly defined and if the roles and responsibilities of each of the parties are not 
clearly defined, as private entities do not want to be micromanaged.42  
Conversely, Waddock, Bodwell and Graves suggest that private firms may find 
that the positive “public relations” benefit of providing assistance to a community in 
times of disaster may supersede the concerns attendant the transparency issue as well as 
the potential negative financial effects of a low-bid pricing structure.43 As referenced 
previously, VanWagner also offers the possibility that the low-bid requirement actually 
                                                 
39 Kapucu, Arslan, and Collins, “Examining Intergovernmental and Interorganizational Response to 
Catastrophic Disaster,” 229; McEntire and Myers, “Preparing Communities for Disasters,” 141, 146.   
40 Busch and Givens, “Public-Private Partnerships in Homeland Security,” 13; Peter V. Schaeffer and 
Scott Loveridge, “Toward an Understanding of Types of Public-Private Cooperation,” Public Performance 
and Management Review 26, no. 2 (December 2002): 172, 174, accessed January 28, 2016, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/3381276. 
41 Busch and Givens, “Public-Private Partnerships in Homeland Security,” 13. 
42 Nutavoot Pongsiri, “Regulation and Public-Private Partnerships,” International Journal of Public 
Sector Management 15, no. 6 (2002): 491, accessed January 28, 2016, doi:10.1108/09513550210439634. 
43 Sandra A. Waddock, Charles Bodwell, and Samuel B. Graves, “Responsibility: The New Business 
Imperative,” Academy of Management Executive 16, no. 2 (May 2002): 136, accessed January 17, 2016, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/4165848. 
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motivates private companies to develop cheaper, more efficient products, which serve to 
benefit not only the government and its citizens, but also the private company’s bottom 
line.44 
5. Formal Contracts between Public and Private Partners 
Busch and Givens highlight the particular obstacles that will inevitably be 
involved in a public-private collaborative scheme, such as management oversight and 
accountability in what is essentially a horizontal organizational structure.45 They 
acknowledge the competing arguments of whether the public sector must always be in 
charge of emergency management efforts, even with private contractors and resources, or 
whether the public would be better served by a managerial structure overseen by a private 
entity.46  
Busch and Givens also point out the potential legal concerns that public-private 
collaborations incite, such as accountability, if the private-sector firm fails to provide the 
resources according to the contractual terms.47 Does the government sue the private firm? 
Busch and Givens argue that clearly defining the roles and obligations of each of the 
parties will curtail the chances of either party violating the other party’s expectations, 
which will, in turn, build trust.48 Girth agrees, but states that there must be trust, in 
addition to tension, between the parties to ensure that the contractor does not neglect its 
duties, which must be memorialized in a contract.49 Schaeffer and Loveridge espouse a 
similar viewpoint in their position that the success of a cooperative relationship is 
dependent upon “adherence to agreed-upon rules and norms.”50 Pongsiri is particularly 
clear in the statement that successful public-private collaborations depend on sound legal 
                                                 
44 VanWagner, “Privatization of Some Emergency Management Functions-Case Study,” 29. 
45 Busch and Givens, “Public-Private Partnerships in Homeland Security,” 10. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Ibid., 11. 
48 Busch and Givens, “Achieving Resilience in Disaster Management,” 7, 9, 15, 17, 18. 
49 Amanda M. Girth, “A Closer Look at Contract Accountability: Exploring the Determinants of 
Sanctions for Unsatisfactory Contract Performance,” Journal of Public Administration Research and 
Theory 24 (October 2012): 325, accessed January 28, 2016, doi:10.1093/jopart/mus033. 
50 Schaeffer and Loveridge, “Toward an Understanding of Types of Public-Private Cooperation,” 171.   
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agreements governing their relationship.51 Without them, “disputes are likely to occur 
and projects can and will be delayed and terminated.”52 Similarly, Koliba, Zia and Mills 
emphasize that confusion over partnership responsibilities and authority in the absence of 
contractual agreements may lead to a “sluggish” response to an emergency.53 Nicholson, 
in fact, labels such contracts as “litigation mitigation,” which are necessary to limit 
liability as much as possible when the contractual duties are triggered.54 
Still, as much as the argument can be made for the benefits of formal contractual 
relationships, Prager highlights a situation in which, contract or not, the government is 
left in a lurch. Specifically, he states that “[c]ontract cancellation provisions are critical 
but will be of no use when the contractor defaults on a vital service.”55  Despite their 
criticism of the lack of contractual agreements post-disaster, Koliba, Zia and Mills also 
acknowledge that legally defined obligations and responsibilities may “get in the way of 
expediency, particularly in times of crisis.”56 Kapucu, Arlsan and Demiroz further 
acknowledge this divergent view and emphasize the importance of remaining flexible in 
emergency situations in order to better respond to the chaotic and unexpected occurrences 
in such dynamic environments.57 Perry and Lindell agree with these critiques of a formal 
contractual structure and argue that the incorporation of specific response details in a 
formal contract is unreasonable since the parties cannot possibly anticipate any and all 
                                                 
51 Pongsiri, “Regulation and Public-Private Partnerships,” 489. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Christopher J. Koliba, Asim Zia, and Russell M. Mills, “Accountability in Governance Networks: 
An Assessment of Public, Private, and Nonprofit Emergency Management Practices Following Hurricane 
Katrina,” Public Administration Review 71, no. 2 (March/April 2011): 216, accessed February 19, 2016, 
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54 William Charles Nicholson, Esq., “Emergency Management and Law,” in Disciplines, Disasters 
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55 Prager, “Contracting Out Government Services,” 181. 
56 Koliba, Zia, and Mills, “Accountability in Governance Networks,” 216. 
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Management Network,” 455. 
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contingencies that may occur.58 Instead, parties must remain flexible to deal with 
unforeseen circumstances.59  
Similar to the above scholars, Stewart, Kolluru and Smith recognize the benefits 
of an informal relationship between public and private partners, which allows the private 
partner to go “above and beyond” the contract requirements to augment response efforts; 
however, they further acknowledge that such informality requires “trust, commitment, 
reciprocity norms and exchange efficiency” between the partners, and that more formal 
contracts may be necessary in the absence of these elements.60 Negron offers a solution 
to the “informal relationship” argument in the form of a “team-building” initiative in 
which the parties to an emergency-related contract engage in recurring brainstorming 
activities by which the parties can identify as many reasonably foreseeable emergency-
related needs as possible and put together a contract responsive to the identified needs, or 
construct necessary contract amendments which meet the needs not previously identified 
in the original contract.61 
6. The Private Sector as a True Emergency Management Partner 
Adler, Petty and Randall posit that the role of government is shifting from the 
“provider” of goods and services, to more of an “administrator” or “manager” of those 
private vendors who are actually contracted to provide goods and services.62 With this 
new role, the authors note that procurement offices will also have to contract out to fill 
the gaps in their knowledge base to fulfill their new “strategic” role.63 Klima and 
Jerolleman recognize this trend and advise that connecting a variety of disciplines from 
both the public and private sectors to contribute to the hazard mitigation effort will allow 
                                                 
58 Perry and Lindell, “Preparedness for Emergency Response,” 342–43. 
59 Ibid., 343. 
60 Stewart, Kolluru, and Smith, “Leveraging Public-Private Partnerships to Improve Community 
Resilience in Times of Disaster,” 346–47. 
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62 Adler, Petty, and Randall, “Public Procurement: Past, Present and Future,” 449. 
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for a more unified and coherent approach to disaster management.64 The NRF also 
espouses the need for “creative thinking” in light of governmental resource shortfalls. 
Kapucu and Hu state that public-private collaborations, being horizontal management 
collaborations, allow for this creative thinking as well as greater flexibility in information 
and experience-sharing initiatives.65 Izumi and Shaw, as well as Wild, cite the informal 
information and experience-sharing efforts that are being made by certain agencies to 
incorporate the expertise and experience of the private sector into the emergency 
management enterprise.66 But, the NRF has stated that private partners should have a 
“direct link” to emergency managers during an incident, and has suggested that these 
partners “be involved in the decision making process.”67 Barlte and Korosec have offered 
an additional more formal solution of advertising a “problem-oriented bid” pursuant to 
which private vendors would offer solutions to emergency-related problems.68  Izumi and 
Shaw take this solution a step further and posit that private vendors should not only 
provide necessary products or solutions, but also participate in the management of the 
projects utilizing those products or solutions.69 
Largely, the literature is in agreement that the public and private sectors must use 
their interconnectedness to provide greater emergency preparedness and management 
efforts and response services for citizens. But, the works reviewed are not all in 
agreement as to when or how best to accomplish these collaborations, as they recognize 
the private-sector concerns in entering into such collaborations, such as those related to 
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transparency, accountability and the threat to the bottom line business model of private 
businesses. Much of the literature, however, focuses on the overarching motivators for 
public-private collaborations, such as fostering a “whole of community” relationship, 
building public trust in government and encouraging patronage for the private businesses 
that helped their communities to recover. Admittedly, the majority of the research seems 
to speak of public-private collaborations in a theoretical manner, without considering the 
practical implications of implementing the theory alongside the procurement and 
emergency management laws currently in effect. Accordingly, the literature, while 
reinforcing the call for increased public-private collaborations in the emergency 
preparedness and response context, also highlights the gaps in the current preparedness 
framework in terms of how to actually put into place the suggested increased 
collaborative structure. The statutory and academic works reviewed confirm that the 
applicable legal framework must be in place, or augmented, as applicable, to allow for 
the most effective resources to be assembled and “at the ready” before that emergency 
occurs.  
C. RESEARCH DESIGN 
1. Objectives 
This thesis has three essential objectives: 1) a study of the argument for increased 
public-private collaborations for more effective emergency preparedness and response 
efforts; 2) a critical review and assessment of the various states’ procurement and 
emergency management laws for the provision of emergency goods, supplies and 
services by private vendors, and whether those laws support increased public-private 
collaborations; and 3) the construction of a “best practices” policy that can be 
implemented as a whole or in a piecemeal fashion that supports the aforesaid increased 
collaborative practices, to the extent agencies are not currently collaborating with private 
entities to their greatest advantage and have the desire and the feasibility to do so.  
2. Selection 
To accomplish the second and third objectives stated above, the research 
considered state law requirements regarding the competitive selection process governing 
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the procurement of emergency-related goods and services, including emergency 
exceptions to the procurement code, as well as state law provisions governing emergency 
management. The research also considered certain federal guidelines regarding 
emergency preparedness and management initiatives, including NIMS and the 
Congressionally-established EMAC. This review reveals that the relevant federal 
guidelines actually encourage and support increased collaborations with the private 
sector. Moreover, a review of the states’ procurement and emergency management laws 
reveals that, in general, the currently existing statutory frameworks allow for the 
recommended collaborations. But, some states do a better job of specifically expressing 
that allowance than others. As such, this thesis will offer certain statutory or policy 
language, which features more explicit statements of encouragement and permissibility 
for public-private collaborations, for agencies to consider to augment their currently 
existing framework to enhance their emergency preparedness efforts. 
3. Limits 
This thesis focused on public-private collaborations that are allowable pursuant to 
state statutory law, whether by an Invitation to Bid (goods and non-professional services) 
or a Request for Proposals (professional services). The proposed goal was to determine 
whether an overarching policy was possible from which states can enhance their 
emergency procurement and/or management initiatives based on increased public-private 
collaborations, or whether certain states already have a preferred framework in place 
from which other states can draw guidance for individual statutory reform. To the extent 
local municipalities within each of the states have in place policies that augment state 
law, those policies would have to agree with the state standard proposed. But, local laws 
were not considered or addressed in this thesis, as such an analysis would be untenable 
for the scope of this project, given the sheer volume of such municipalities in existence. 
That being said, the limited research conducted in that regard reveals that certain 
municipalities have ordinances or similar provisions that actually prohibit or limit 
emergency preparedness and management initiatives that their respective state’s laws 
otherwise allow. While further study and resolution of this issue is beyond the scope of 
 18 
this thesis, this finding reveals a matter that requires additional research and potential 
policy recommendations.   
4. Data Sources 
The sources of the statutory data reviewed and analyzed were obtained through 
online databases that provided the full text and annotations for the states’ procurement 
and emergency management laws, such as Westlaw. In addition to the statutory text, the 
research considered interpretations of the relevant procurement and emergency 
management laws as well as law reviews and other scholarly or academic journals that 
have investigated and discussed the above-stated laws and applicable federal standards. 
The research also reviewed publicly available information by FEMA and DHS in 
connection with emergency preparedness and management directives and initiatives. In 
addition, the research utilized publicly available databases to identify and investigate the 
scholarly and academic research conducted on the logistics, advantages, disadvantages, 
and other considerations comprising the concept of public-private collaborations between 
government agencies and the private sector in connection with emergency preparedness, 
management and response efforts. 
5. Type and Mode of Analysis 
This thesis utilized the Best Practice Research methodology to identify “what 
works” in the context of private-sector integration in public sector emergency 
management, and to extrapolate a “best practices” model based on a review of what is 
currently in place.70 Veselý states that the primary goal of this particular methodology is 
to improve “the working of a social institution” by “adopting certain principles of the 
working of another institution that appears more successful.”71 To accomplish this goal, 
one must first consider the “target site” (i.e., the institution one desires to improve and 
assess how and why such institution is lacking).72 Then, one must look for “exemplars of 
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working practices that appear superior” and explain how and why a certain practice 
“works” in that context.73 Ultimately, one must “extrapolate” what is found from the 
“exemplar” research and apply it to the “target site.”74  
In this case, the “target site” is that hypothetical governmental institution that 
does not collaborate with the private sector for emergency management purposes in such 
a way so as to obtain the greatest benefit for its citizens from the available private-sector 
resources. In considering the adverse effect, if any, of the failure to use public-private 
collaborations to the maximum extent allowable, the research critically assessed 1) the 
existing literature regarding such collaborations and how those collaborations contribute 
to or detract from effective emergency preparedness and management, and 2) the current 
state procurement and emergency management laws and how they support or prohibit 
public-private collaborations in the emergency preparedness and management context. In 
doing so, the research meets the preferred “completeness” aspect of this methodology by 
including all states in the analysis.75 
What is not known is the full scope of the potential political and/or feasibility 
constraints with regard to the proposed policy recommendations that may prohibit their 
whole or piecemeal implementation. The author attempted to identify as many of these 
constraints or obstacles as possible, but unless such constraints were discoverable through 
publicly available research and literature, the author could not account for that which was 
not publicly disclosed. Consequently, the policy recommendations proposed herein may 
make sense academically, but when assessed through the lens of the particular political/
legal landscape, may simply be academic and too idealistic for implementation. Of 
course, some states may deem the proposed policy unnecessary in light their current 
emergency management practices. Thus, those states which desire to do so may wish to 
consider that which is proposed in a piecemeal fashion, consistent with that particular 
state’s political and feasibility realities. Accordingly, what is a “best” practice, as 
extrapolated from the academic literature and statutory review, may or may not be a 
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“smart” practice based on “context” (i.e., the above-referenced political and/or legal 
feasibility of a particular jurisdiction).76 
According to Veselý, this particular methodology is properly applied by “clearly 
defin[ing] the purpose” or “what is to be achieved.”77 Thus, in addition to the 
identification of weaknesses or gaps in the academic literature on this topic, as well as the 
identification of weaknesses or gaps in the current procurement and emergency 
management laws, this thesis also recommends a policy to guide future emergency 
preparedness and management efforts by suggesting reformatory statutory language to 
employ on a state-by-state basis to enhance such efforts. The purpose of this thesis is to 
enhance the overall emergency preparedness and response effort, to the extent states are 
not currently collaborating with private entities in such a way so as to make the best use 
of private resources and expertise for the greater benefit of the public. As such, the policy 
proposed intends to meaningfully contribute to that effort by whatever method is most 
feasible for the jurisdiction considering it.  
6. Output 
The research has revealed the states have statutory frameworks in place that 
“work” (i.e., that generally allow for increased public-private collaborations for the 
provision of necessary emergency goods and supplies in a dynamic emergency 
environment in an effective manner). But, some states have enacted laws that expressly 
call for increased public-private collaborations and have laws that better enable agencies 
to act accordingly. Consequently, this thesis proposes a model framework that should be 
used as a guide pursuant to which state-by-state reform can be accomplished, either on a 
whole or piecemeal basis, based upon the content of the respective statutory language 
currently in force and the states’ desire to engage in such reform. This output will guide 
emergency managers, procurement officials, attorneys for state and local governments, 
legislators and policymakers in preparing their respective jurisdictions and communities 
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for disaster by making use of all available resources to the greatest degree possible well 
before the disaster occurs. 
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II. INTRODUCTION 
Preparedness is one of the key foundations of emergency management.78 States 
and municipalities have historically built and, in fact, continue to build their respective 
preparedness models through the execution of various mutual aid agreements, both 
intrastate and interstate, to increase otherwise limited governmental resources and/or to 
provide for outside support when a particular jurisdiction is totally devastated.79 But, 
such mutual aid agreements are not enough as they only allow for the sharing of 
governmental resources by and among public agencies. The research reveals a continued 
call for greater collaborative preparedness efforts between public agencies and the private 
sector prior to the occurrence of an emergency or disaster for more effective response and 
recovery. These collaborations should not come simply by way of contracts for 
emergency-related goods, services and other resources. Rather, for these collaborations to 
be most effective, the private sector should be a true partner with governmental agencies, 
beginning in the initial emergency management planning stages.  
In general, the states have procurement and emergency management statutory 
frameworks in place to make greater public-private collaborations a reality. But, some 
states and many of their respective municipalities are either not using these laws to 
achieve maximum collaboration, or the municipalities have enacted stricter requirements 
in their respective Home Rule Charters or Municipal Codes that make such collaborations 
unduly burdensome. While a review of the emergency management laws governing 
individual municipalities and counties/parishes is beyond the scope of this thesis, it is 
sufficient to mention here that the limited research conducted in that regard demonstrates 
that the failure to take full advantage of what is available from the private sector is 
limiting those jurisdictions’ abilities to form beneficial partnerships to ensure that 
necessary resources are obtained before a disaster occurs and are provided to citizens as 
soon after a disaster as possible. Moreover, the failure to account for the time that is 
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needed to competitively bid for contracts for those reasonably foreseeable and anticipated 
emergency services and resources prior to a disaster event leaves the emergency “no-bid” 
exception to procurement the only viable option. Reliance on this option renders 
jurisdictions vulnerable to exploitation and fraud, which can financially devastate the 
recovery process, and totally undermine public trust.80 As will be discussed more fully, 
states have attempted to mitigate against these vulnerabilities statutorily; however, these 
pronouncements do not absolutely negate the reality that agencies may ultimately be 
constrained to rely on the emergency exception as a result of poor planning.  
This thesis will review the advantages of partnering with the private sector from 
the public agency perspective, both at the planning stage and at the procurement/contract 
stage, and will also consider the concerns that may arise in connection with forming such 
partnerships. Arguing that the advantages of public-private collaborations, both for the 
public and private sectors, outweigh any perceived concerns, the thesis will further 
consider the most effective means by which to memorialize these collaborations, noting 
the importance of formal contracts, while also acknowledging that greater contract 
flexibility is needed to effectively respond to the dynamic nature of disasters, whether 
natural or man-made. This thesis will provide a reference to the most representative of 
the states’ laws currently in effect with regard to emergency procurement as well as 
emergency management in order to demonstrate that the requisite statutory authority 
generally exists to support increased public-private collaborations at all phases of 
emergency management. Some states have more expressly and explicitly supported 
private-sector collaboration than others, arguably making such collaborations more 
feasible in certain jurisdictions than others. Accordingly, this thesis will ultimately offer a 
model policy framework for consideration and integration, in whole or in part, into each 
state’s respective statutory framework to enhance the legal support for increased 
collaboration with the private sector on a nationwide basis, to the extent such reform is 
necessary, desired and politically feasible. This policy is based on the author’s review of 
the various relevant statutory provisions governing emergency procurement and 
emergency management services. 
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III. EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES: A 
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
The touchstone of emergency preparedness and management in the United States 
is NIMS. DHS issued NIMS on March 1, 2004, in response to Congress’ expressed need 
for a “common incident management system” in the Homeland Security Act of 2002.81 
NIMS is the operational arm of the NRP.82 In that regard, NIMS provides the framework 
and sets the required national industry emergency planning standard under which 
emergency management and response personnel and their affiliated organizations work 
together to implement preparedness initiatives.83 NIMS’ emergency response standard 
provides for a well-researched and planned nationwide preparedness template for all 
states, which allows for coordinated and effective emergency management and incident 
response actions.84 To that end, NIMS espouses a “continuous cycle of planning, 
organizing, training, equipping, exercising, evaluating, and taking corrective action” and 
stresses a response plan that optimizes “the combined efforts of all participants,” both 
public and private.85 In fact, the NRF is clear that “[g]overnment resources alone cannot 
meet all the needs of those affected by major disasters” and further states that the NIMS 
framework calls for both public and private stakeholders to be “activated, engaged, and 
integrated to respond to a major or catastrophic incident.”86 In fact, in the context of a 
federally-declared emergency, adoption of NIMS is a pre-condition for federal assistance 
in the emergency preparedness context, at the risk of agencies losing federal grant 
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funding.87 Under such pre-condition, state and local organizations must develop an 
Emergency Operations Plan or Incident Action Plan to prepare for and, eventually, 
manage the eventual emergency or disaster event.88 
Depending on the severity of the emergency or disaster, the necessary resources 
and services required to effectively respond to natural or man-made disasters in 
accordance with the NIMS standard may simply be beyond the abilities of individual 
jurisdictions; as such, mutual aid and assistance agreements become indispensable for 
agencies, organizations and jurisdictions to share resources and services, establish 
responsibilities for disaster response and arrange for emergency assistance.89 
Accordingly, an essential part of the NIMS “common incident management system” 
framework is EMAC.90 Congress established EMAC pursuant to its enactment of Public 
Law 104-321 on October 19, 1996.91 EMAC provides: 
[M]utual assistance between the states…in managing any emergency 
disaster that is duly declared by the Governor of the affected state, 
whether arising from natural disaster, technological hazard, man-made 
disaster, civil emergency aspects of resources shortages, community 
disorders, insurgency, or enemy attack.92  
Through its interstate compact mechanism, EMAC essentially augments the federal 
disaster response system. EMAC has been adopted by all fifty states, the District of 
Columbia, Puerto Rico, Guam and the United States Virgin Islands.93  
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EMAC anticipates the execution of various other supplemental aid agreements, 
which agreements can restrict or expand the existing EMAC provisions, address legal 
issues not considered by EMAC and provide for cooperation when circumstances “do not 
rise to the level of [g]overnor-declared emergencies.”94 This is particularly important 
because while EMAC provides interstate mechanisms for providing assistance and 
sharing resources during disasters, it does not provide mechanisms for collaborative “pre-
disaster” preparedness initiatives, either interstate, intrastate or with private entities.95 
Instead, states must create and implement preparedness initiatives, both through 
preparedness plans and formalized contracts for emergency goods and services, to not 
only brace themselves as best as possible for whatever emergency or disaster may occur, 
but to also engage in risk reduction or mitigation initiatives to prevent total devastation 
when that disaster event does occur.  
Given that this concept of “mitigation” has become an increasingly more focused 
directive issued to the states in assembling their emergency management plans, scholars, 
such as Kiefer, have decided that mitigation is the pivotal point to bring “the private 
sector into the emergency management system” as the economic stability of a community 
depends on risk reduction and, consequently, preparedness initiatives to enhance such 
risk reduction.96 Others, though, have suggested that the recovery phase is when this 
collaboration is most effective, as the local partners have the unique knowledge to rebuild 
the community and most effectively respond to the adverse effects befalling that 
community after a disaster.97 While collaborations are important in the recovery stage, 
the planning stage is necessarily the most critical for the suggested collaborative practices 
in that this is where risk assessment data is collected, reviewed and analyzed, and plans, 
procedures, agreements and strategies are developed and integrated into a cohesive 
protocol that outlines roles, responsibilities and action items to enable an effective 
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response and recovery effort.98 Accordingly, this “pre-disaster” stage is where states can 
best utilize private-sector resources to not only identify the necessary resources that must 
be “at the ready” to respond to whatever disaster may occur, but to also augment their 
emergency preparedness and management plans.  
NIMS, in fact, has recognized the vital role the private sector plays in all phases 
of emergency management and has encouraged that the private sector be incorporated in 
the “manage[ment] [of] incidents involving all threats and hazards.”99 The NRF 
specifically advocates for the inclusion of private-sector entities by “collaborating with 
emergency management personnel before an incident occurs to determine what assistance 
may be necessary and how they can support local emergency management during 
response operations.”100 According to the NIMS National Preparedness System, 
“preparedness efforts involve and affect the whole community” and, as such, 
preparedness plans must be coordinated with “all parts of the whole community: 
individuals, businesses, nonprofits, community and faith-based groups, and all levels of 
government.”101 The private sector is, thus, well-positioned to fill the emergency 
management gaps left by relying solely on governmental resources. 
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IV. INCREASED “PRE-DISASTER” PUBLIC-PRIVATE 
COLLABORATIONS FOR BETTER EMERGENCY 
MANAGEMENT 
Simply stated, it is impossible for federal, state and local governments to plan and 
prepare for every possible need, every piece of equipment or service or all necessary 
personnel to sufficiently respond to and recover from the many possible disaster or 
emergency situations. States do have certain statutory measures in place to attempt to 
mitigate against being unprepared, such as required annual updates of emergency 
response plans and annual inventories of emergency services, goods, personnel and 
related resources. But, intrastate, and even interstate, planning alone is not sufficient to 
meet the potential devastation of an event like a 500-year hurricane. Rather, the private 
sector has to be involved.  
A. THE PRIVATE SECTOR AS A SOLUTION TO THE GOVERNMENTAL 
RESOURCE GAP 
According to Copenhaver in his article, “Integrating the Private Sector in 
Homeland Security Preparation and Response,” “no state or local government can ignore 
the private sector, either in its emergency response planning or its response activities.”102 
In fact, the argument in favor of this position provides that “government cannot protect 
our communities and our homeland either from terrorist threats or natural disasters, 
without also mobilizing the full support and involvement of the private sector.”103 Jones 
confirms that it is inevitable that the government will lack the necessary resources, 
technology, personnel, experience, expertise and, simply, time to construct and 
implement all of its emergency preparedness and management protocols.104 The private 
sector is the best option to fill this need.105 It is, after all, the response and recovery of the 
private business sector of a community that will drive that community’s overall recovery 
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following an emergency or disaster.106 Research has shown the economic damage caused 
as a result of disasters has increased steadily over the last few years.107 Moreover, given 
the increased globalized economy, businesses damaged domestically can have adverse 
economic effects in other countries and, conversely, domestic businesses housed in 
“safe” states can be negatively affected by disasters or emergencies that occur in other 
parts of the world.108 Thus, private entities have an even greater interest in developing 
emergency preparedness efforts to support their own “business continuity in the face of 
natural or man-made disasters.”109  
The prime advantage for the public sector in partnering with private-sector 
entities is the public sector’s ability to share in and reap the benefits of a private 
company’s business continuity plan.110 Izumi and Shaw confirm that “[t]he greatest 
strength of the private sector is its abundant resources, expertise and technology.”111 
Stewart, Kolluru and Smith also agree that “[t]he public-private interface offers 
opportunities for decision makers at all levels of government to build resilience by 
proactively coordinating and positioning the capabilities of stakeholders to 
collaboratively manage disaster consequences.”112 This collaboration allows for the 
blending of the public accountability of government with the “market-driven” strategies 
of the private sector to create relationships to better prepare for catastrophes.113 As 
disasters affect the whole community, public and private alike, so must the whole 
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community be willing to assist in the recovery effort.114 Indeed, “[d]isasters create an 
atmosphere wherein organizations from different sectors feel the shared risk and 
willingly coordinate their shared responsibilities.”115 This must start in the planning 
stages to ensure business continuity in the face of a disaster, both for the government and 
the private sector.  
B. THE INTEGRATION OF PRIVATE SECTOR BUSINESS CONTINUITY 
EXPERTISE INTO GOVERNMENTAL EMERGENCY PLANNING 
Business continuity is “[a]n ongoing process to ensure that the necessary steps are 
taken to identify the impacts of potential losses and maintain viable recovery strategies, 
recovery plans and continuity of services.”116 According to Copenhaver, the 
government’s continuity of operations plan and a private entity’s business continuity plan 
have the same end goal: “maintaining or quickly restoring functions that are mission-
critical to the entities covered by the plans.”117 Thus, the private sector’s experience in 
business continuity planning can be integrated with government planning to arrive at a 
“best practices” continuity response and recovery plan that will benefit all sectors of a 
community.118  
Office Depot, for example, has an “in-house” division in place that provides 
tutorials and tips for small businesses in building their own disaster preparedness and 
recovery plans, and further sponsors the Business Civic Leadership Center’s National 
Disaster Help Desk for Business to provide assistance for businesses during disasters.119 
This is exemplary of the NRF’s recognition that “[i]n many cases, private sector 
organizations have immediate access to commodities and services that can support 
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incident response, making them key potential contributors of resources.”120 But, imagine 
if companies like Office Depot were able to offer their expertise on a formalized, 
statutorily-recognized basis to governmental agencies nationwide so that governments 
had access to what private-sector resources routinely provide and were able to integrate 
that expertise into their own emergency-related operations. 
The NRF contemplates the foregoing possibility and highlights the following key 
ways that the private sector can contribute prior to, during and/or after an emergency: 
• Addressing the response needs of employees, infrastructure, and facilities 
• Protecting information and maintaining the continuity of business 
operations 
• Planning for, responding to, and recovering from incidents that impact 
their own infrastructure and facilities 
• Collaborating with emergency management personnel to determine what 
assistance may be required and how they can provide needed support 
• Contributing to communication and information sharing efforts during 
incidents 
• Planning, training, and exercising their response capabilities 
• Providing assistance specified under mutual aid and assistance agreements 
• Contributing resources, personnel, and expertise; helping to shape 
objectives; and receiving information about the status of the 
community.121 
The NRF’s projections are reflective of Wal-Mart’s and Home Depot’s 
application of their respective supply chain management structures to deliver necessary 
post-Katrina resources to the devastated communities in the Gulf South.122 The Wal-Mart 
disaster response model, in particular, highlights the advantages for a public agency in 
integrating private-sector expertise into its emergency operations plan.  
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According to its Senior Director of Global Emergency Management, Mark 
Cooper,123 Wal-Mart has a corporate EOC in Bentonville, Arkansas as well as division-
based EOCs and additional distribution centers that are located in jurisdictions that are 
considered to be “at high risk.”124 Wal-Mart further has an “in-house meteorologist who 
interprets weather data provided by government agencies, like the National Weather 
Service or the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration,” to provide to Wal-
Mart decision makers during a disaster event.125 Moreover, to ensure a consistent supply 
chain, Wal-Mart requires its suppliers to adhere to certain minimum standards to ensure 
that necessary goods will be supplied and available for distribution during times of 
disaster.126 Wal-Mart also maintains a close working relationship with power companies 
in order for it to determine the best way to employ alternate power sources to continue its 
business operations.127 Most importantly, Wal-Mart has established and maintains 
relationships with federal, state and local government representatives that allow it to 
work directly with those governments when disasters occur and resolve many supply and 
demand issues that arise in such situations.128 All of the foregoing demonstrates the 
advantage of increased collaborations between the government and the private sector, and 
the way in which such collaborations are essential to enhancing community resilience. 
But, large-scale national corporations cannot solely drive the emergency management 
effort with government entities. Smaller businesses, equipped with valuable knowledge 
of the unique needs of their locality, have an important role to play and must be included 
in the competitive procurement of private-sector resources. 
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1. The Benefits of Competitive Procurement for the Private Sector 
As is evident based on the foregoing, it is much more feasible for large financially 
successful international companies, like Wal-Mart or Home Depot, to render needed aid 
or provide assistance to a community in connection with an emergency or disaster. But, 
smaller and/or local businesses may be more affected by a disaster and, thus, may have 
greater incentive to participate in and reap the benefits from public-private collaborations 
if jurisdictions heed the call to enter into contractual emergency preparedness agreements 
in anticipation of an emergency or disaster. It is then that an agency is best able to afford 
small and/or locally owned businesses the opportunity to compete for specific contracts 
through the competitive selection process. At the very least, smaller businesses can be 
retained by the larger national chains through disadvantaged business enterprise 
initiatives, which require a certain percentage of the contract work to be performed by 
“disadvantaged” businesses (i.e., smaller businesses and/or those owned by minorities 
and/or women).129  
Egan and Anderson have recognized the importance of each of these business 
types.130 Specifically, they posit that while national chains have greater resources, market 
power and supply chain expertise, smaller businesses “have ties to local neighborhoods, 
regular customers and a strong interest in getting the doors open.”131 Of course, the value 
of the small business is wholly dependent upon the level of devastation wrought upon its 
community and its ability to reopen its doors and have customers able to buy its goods.132 
But, this is why robust disaster planning, response and recovery efforts that identify 
community-specific emergency-related goods and services, and allow for the timely 
competitive procurement of those goods and services are so important.133 
                                                 
129 City of New Orleans, Chief Administrative Office, Policy Memorandum No. 46(R) – Policies and 
Procedures for Disadvantaged Business Enterprise (DBE) Program (April 26, 2004), accessed January 28, 
2016, http://www.nola.gov/chief-administrative-office/policies/policies/no-46-(r)-policies-and-procedures-
for-disadvantage/. 
130 Egan and Anderson, “Considerations for a Model of Public-Private Sector Collaboration in the 
Provision of Disaster Relief,” 6. 
131 Ibid. 
132 Ibid., 6–7. 
133 Ibid., 8. 
 35 
At least statutorily, states generally require their procurement agencies to use the 
competitive procurement method to ensure that the necessary emergency-related goods 
and services are in place by the properly procured vendors in enough time to effectively 
respond to the emergency. For example, Louisiana’s Administrative Code expressly 
states that “[t]he source selection method used shall be selected with a view to the end of 
assuring that the required supplies, services, or major repair items are procured in time to 
meet the emergency.”134 Its statutory code further states that one of the primary functions 
of the Governor’s Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness is to 
“[s]tudy the feasibility of pre-bidding of contracts to provide for disaster response 
services…and enter into such contracts deemed to be in the best interest of the state.”135 
Ideally, a sound preparedness initiative allows a governmental agency to identify 
its emergency resources beforehand, and then to identify the supplies and equipment that 
it needs to acquire.136 As those needed resources are identified, a government emergency 
manager can begin preparations of public invitations to bid for those resources and 
engage all interested private-sector participants, both large and small, to compete for 
public contracts through the competitive selection process. Allowing sufficient time to 
consider needs and advertise for bids will further benefit the government agency in terms 
of what the private sector is positioned to offer. In order to “win” the public contract, a 
private vendor has to submit the best price. According to VanWagner, it is this need to 
reduce costs that results in private-sector innovations which are then provided for the 
benefit of the public sector.137 She reasons that “[t]his need to reduce costs drives the 
private sector toward innovation–creating new products to increase efficiency, 
effectiveness, and affordability of their services.”138 
 Indeed, private-sector expertise can be most beneficial in identifying the latest 
innovations that can best assist in emergency management initiatives and in further 
                                                 
134 La. Admin. Code tit. 34, pt. V, §1109. 
135 La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §29:726 (West, Westlaw through the 2015 Regular Session). 
136 McEntire and Myers, “Preparing Communities for Disasters,” 141, 146.   
137 VanWagner, “Privatization of Some Emergency Management Functions–Case Study,” 29. 
138 Ibid. 
 36 
determining which supplies, services and goods would be necessary to meet a disaster or 
emergency. In fact, Nebraska law permits, as part of its emergency operations plan, “[a]n 
analysis of past and potential disasters [and] emergencies, including an identification of 
the functions and resources required to cope with such occurrences,” and encourages 
expert professional and technical input from the private sector in that regard.139  
Wilkins presents a valid counterargument to this position in her view that the 
private sector’s involvement must necessarily be limited by its lack of jurisdiction to 
address certain administrative duties of public agencies in the context of emergency 
management, such as law enforcement and public emergency medical issues that may 
arise during a disaster.140 But, the private sector’s legal or jurisdictional inability to 
address every emergency-related need of a particular region does not detract from the 
value that its expertise can lend to enhance preparedness and mitigation efforts “pre-
disaster,” as well as the efficient provision of needed supplies “post-disaster” to aid in 
response and recovery.141 As such, collaborations with the private sector must be 
formulated before a disaster occurs in order to 1) put in place well-researched “whole of 
community” preparedness plans that are based on both public and private sector “best 
practices,” and 2) be ready to provide what the government alone cannot during and after 
a disaster event. As set forth in the next section, state law provides the general framework 
to support these collaborations and enhance states’ emergency preparedness initiatives.   
2. The Emergency Management Legal Framework Governing the 
Integration of Private Sector Resources  
From a statutory perspective, the states have adopted this “collaborative” 
viewpoint into their emergency management framework. Alabama law is representative 
of the most general way in which states have provided for the inclusion of the private 
sector in emergency management. It contains a general statement that allows its local 
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emergency management directors to enter into mutual aid agreements with other public 
and private agencies to provide assistance in case of an overwhelming disaster.142 
Similarly, but in a somewhat more precise fashion, Arkansas charges its Department of 
Emergency Management to “procure and “pre-position supplies, medicines, materials, 
and equipment[,]” and make surveys of available private resources and enter into 
appropriate contracts to secure those resources “under terms and conditions agreed 
upon.”143 Likewise, other states feature permissive language similar to Alabama and 
Arkansas, such as Colorado, Delaware, Iowa and Tennessee, whose respective 
procurement, homeland security and emergency management departments are directed to 
contract with private entities to carry out the duties of those divisions.144 
Georgia’s Emergency Management Law, however, contains arguably the most 
comprehensive representation of the states’ respective stated “purpose” of their 
emergency management agencies. It provides:  
It is further declared…that all emergency management functions of this 
state be coordinated to the maximum extent with the comparable functions 
of the federal government, including its various departments and agencies; 
of other states and localities; and of private agencies of every type, to the 
end that the most effective preparation and use may be made of the 
nation’s manpower, resources, and facilities for dealing with any 
emergency or disaster that may occur.145  
Ga. Code Ann. § 38-3-6 expands the reach of this purpose in its pronouncement 
that the statues under the Georgia Emergency Management title be “liberally construed” 
in order to “effectuate their purposes.”146 Hawaii’s Emergency Management Law more 
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specifically integrates the federal directive to partner with the private sector with its 
addition of the phrase “and with private-sector and nonprofit organizations” to the above-
stated list of coordinating agencies.147 Moreover, it arguably expands the liberal 
construction intent evidenced in the majority of the states’ laws by stating that “in 
construing this chapter, due consideration shall be given to the circumstances as they 
exist from time to time.”148 It, thus, stands to reason that, in Hawaii, certain 
circumstances could ostensibly broaden the involvement of the private sector for 
emergency management purposes. Indeed, the generality of the language leads the 
practitioner to reasonably rely on this language to justify the privatization of a myriad of 
governmental emergency-related functions, depending on the needs and desires of the 
agency. In fact, the accompanying language found later in the same statute confirms the 
breadth of the statute’s reach to encompass initiatives to:  
Sponsor and develop mutual aid plans and agreements for emergency 
management between the State, one or more counties, and other 
governmental, private-sector, and nonprofit organizations, for the 
furnishing or exchange of food, clothing, medicine, and other materials; 
engineering services; emergency housing; police services; health, medical, 
and related services; firefighting, rescue, transportation, and construction 
services and facilities; personnel necessary to provide or conduct these 
services; and such other materials, facilities, personnel, and services as 
may be needed.149 
Florida, which also encourages private-sector involvement more specifically than 
other states, expressly directs its emergency management agency to:  
[A]scertain the requirements of the state and its political subdivisions for 
equipment and supplies of all kinds in the event of an emergency; plan for 
and either procure supplies, medicines, materials, and equipment or enter 
into memoranda of agreement or open purchase orders that will ensure 
their availability.150 
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The California legislature, though, seems to have made the most precise and 
express support of collaboration with the private sector for emergency management 
purposes. Specifically, it has made the express acknowledgment that “this state can only 
truly be prepared for the next disaster if the public and private sector collaborate.”151 
California’s emergency management laws specifically encourage the inclusion of private 
businesses in the state’s preparedness initiatives, and support the integration of “private 
sector emergency preparedness measures into governmental disaster planning 
programs.”152 The law further enables the California Emergency Management Agency to 
“[d]evelop programs so that businesses and government can work cooperatively to 
advance technology that will protect the public during disasters.”153 Based on a review of 
this representative statutory language, there seems to be an overwhelming recognition of 
the need and desire for the private sector’s involvement in emergency preparedness and 
management initiatives. This review of the enabling statutory language further reveals 
that the legislation necessary to support the integration of this assistance is already 
largely in place. So, for those agencies that have not fully embraced the private-sector 
collaboration concept, what is holding them back? 
3. Privatization: Its Advantages and Pitfalls 
Considering the foregoing discussion, it may seem that public-private 
collaborations have only positive implications; however, the research reveals a resistance 
with regard to overzealous governmental integration with the private sector. Indeed, 
while Adler, Petty and Randall point to governmental budget concerns as a justification 
for increased privatization of traditional governmental services, such as emergency 
preparedness and management, other scholars have countered that such expanded 
privatization “represents an assault on traditional relays of democratic accountability.”154 
Gotham specifically argues: 
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Privatization especially in the realm of emergency management policy and 
disaster recovery services raises several issues fundamental to notions of 
civil society, community, and citizenship. By providing assistance to 
communities affected by disasters, the state aids its citizens, asserts its 
power, and reproduces its sovereignty. In shifting emergency management 
responsibilities from government to market, privatization addresses 
disaster victims not as citizens and members of an aggrieved community 
but as atomized customers, clients, and consumers. In doing so, 
privatization obscures liability and accountability for problematic post-
disaster outcomes, and disarticulates public purposes from post-disaster 
recovery and rebuilding activities. 
… 
In addition, privatization prioritizes the goals and interests of private 
companies and allows such groups to use public resources and power to 
achieve what are essentially private aims.155 
It is important to put Gotham’s view in context, though. His analysis was 
conducted in connection with the post-Katrina out-of-control spending by multinational 
corporations that did not have scoped statements of work included in the contractual 
terms, nor negotiated terms and conditions that appropriately regulated the parties’ 
relationship or oversight responsibilities.156 As will be discussed further, Gotham’s 
argument, while contrary to the view of the need for increased public-private 
collaborations, actually provides the precise reasoning for why formalized contracts 
between the parties are necessary and why emergency “no-bid” procurements can 
become dangerous.   
Moreover, contrary to Gotham’s view, the categorization of “disaster victim” as a 
“citizen,” “customer,” “client,” or “consumer” should not be mutually exclusive. In fact, 
perhaps victims would be better served if they were treated as customers or clients, as 
opposed to citizens. Urby and McEntire reference the “new public management” form of 
government that applies market-based operations to provide the community with the best 
products for the best prices, and includes performance-driven benchmarks in its 
contractual agreements with private vendors.157 Especially in the emergency context, this 
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form of government would most realistically be the most effective in that the response to 
a disaster or emergency will be judged based on the results of the emergency 
management strategy. As such, the emergency-related contracts should be constructed in 
a way that ensures those results to the maximum extent possible. On the other hand, like 
Gotham, Urby and McEntire also laud the advantages of the “new public service” model 
of government in which the goal is to serve “citizens” and not “customers” through 
building relationships of trust and creating a collaborative environment between the 
government and citizens as well as among citizens themselves.158 In support of their 
position, Urby and McEntire specifically state that this model is in line with FEMA’s 
“Whole Community” approach which fosters a collaborative approach in order to 
understand the capabilities of and resources available across the community.159  
While the latter approach would be most advantageous in the preparedness/
planning stages when the experts are meeting around the emergency management table, 
engaging in theoretical management discussions, and crafting the overarching emergency 
management strategy, this thesis stands for the proposition that the actual contractual 
agreements with private vendors must be bid and negotiated with an eye toward serving 
the “customer” (i.e., “citizen”) with the best emergency response goods and services 
possible at the best prices. Accordingly, it stands to reason that the public service model 
works best at the preparedness/planning stage while the public management model 
should apply to the contracting/negotiation stage. In fact, disregarding the concept of 
treating the citizen as a valued customer arguably provides the foundation for a public 
agency to devalue the importance of competitive procurement, which ensures its 
“customers” get the “best product” for the “best price” and, instead, rely on the “no-bid” 
exception in the emergency context. But, as is demonstrated below, overuse or 
overreliance on this exception could subject a public agency to a host of dangers, 
including the total loss of the public’s (i.e., its “customer’s”) trust. 
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C. THE EMERGENCY “NO BID” EXCEPTION TO COMPETITIVE 
PROCUREMENT AND THE DANGER IT POSES 
Competitive procurement methods require private firms to compete to provide the 
best quality products at the best prices in the most efficient and effective way to a 
community.160 Conversely, in “no-bid” emergency procurements, governmental agencies 
essentially have to purchase whatever is available at whatever price is available. 
Negotiating a deal at this point is wholly untenable given the rapid response needed in an 
emergency. Accordingly, “no-bid” emergency contracts leave a governmental entity and 
its citizens vulnerable to high prices, low quality, exploitation and fraud.161 In fact, 
Gotham cautions that increased privatization will only provide a vehicle for private 
entities to capitalize on the rapid need for resources and to treat disasters as “money 
making opportunities.”162 Schultz and Søreide agree, stating that “as the urgency of an 
emergency decreases bargaining power anyway, rapid procurement is particularly prone 
to inflated prices and expenditures.”163 In addition, “no-bid” arrangements entered into 
pursuant to emergency exceptions allow the potential for bribery and kickback 
opportunities for public officials.164 States’ laws recognize this exception and encourage 
as much competition as is practicable in an emergency; however, the laws’ various 
discretionary catchall language arguably invites opportunities for abuse that should be 
acknowledged and guarded against. 
It is a well-accepted tenet of law that adherence to mandatory competitive 
procurement rules is waived for the purchase of goods and services required in an 
emergency situation when prompt purchase action becomes necessary for health and 
safety reasons.165 What qualifies as an emergency so as to justify a waiver of statutory 
law varies somewhat from state to state, but all states are consistent that an emergency is 
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not an “oops, we forgot to purchase X or Y.” As succinctly stated by the Rhode Island 
legislature, “[i]nadequate anticipation of need shall not be considered justification for 
‘emergency’ purchases.”166 Simply, “poor planning is not an emergency.”167 
Based on a review of all states’ emergency procurement laws, the dispositive 
quality of a qualifying event is that which is a threat to public health, welfare, and safety. 
Certain states, such as Ohio and Kentucky, include “an interruption in utility services” in 
their consideration of qualifying events.168 Georgia allows even more flexibility, defining 
“emergencies” to include those “arising from any unforeseen causes, including delay by 
contractors, delay in transportation, breakdown in machinery, unanticipated volume of 
work, or upon the declaration of a state of emergency.”169 Other states, like Connecticut 
and Delaware, include a qualifier that emergencies must be “those extraordinary 
conditions or contingencies that cannot reasonably be foreseen and guarded against.”170 
Certain courts that have considered this qualifier have ruled that “an occurrence or 
condition is unforeseen when it is not anticipated, when it creates a situation which 
cannot be remedied by exercise of reasonable care, or when it is fortuitous.”171 Kentucky 
law arguably provides the most comprehensive description of circumstances that qualify 
as an “emergency:”  
An emergency condition is a situation which creates a threat or impending 
threat to public health, welfare, or safety such as may arise by reason of 
fires, floods, tornadoes, other natural or man-caused disasters, epidemics, 
riots, enemy attack, sabotage, explosion, power failure, energy shortages, 
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transportation emergencies, equipment failures, state or federal legislative 
mandates, or similar events. The existence of the emergency condition 
creates an immediate and serious need for services, construction, or items 
of tangible personal property that cannot be met through normal 
procurement methods and the lack of which would seriously threaten the 
functioning of government, the preservation or protection of property, or 
the health or safety of any person.172 
Regardless of the type of emergency, though, an “[e]mergency procurement shall 
be limited to only those supplies, services, or major repair items necessary to meet the 
emergency.”173 Also, no matter the type of emergency, the general statutory law 
mandates as much competition as possible “to the extent practicable under the 
circumstances.”174 North Carolina “encourages” negotiation with emergency vendors for 
the “best price possible” even when purchasing agencies are acting under the exception to 
competitive procurement.175 Likewise, under its emergency exception to competitive 
procurement, Pennsylvania mandates the solicitation of “at least two bids” if 
“practical.”176  Nevada’s law attempts to prevent price-gouging common in “no-bid” 
procurements in the context of emergency personal safety equipment, and provides: 
3. The purchase of personal safety equipment for use by a response agency 
or any other local governmental agency is not subject to the requirements 
of this chapter for competitive bidding, as determined by the governing 
body or its authorized representative, if:  
(a) The personal safety equipment will be used by personnel of the 
response agency or other local governmental agency in preventing, 
responding to or providing services of recovery or relief in connection 
with emergencies, acts of terrorism or other natural or man-made disasters 
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in which the health, safety or welfare of those personnel may be 
compromised, impaired or otherwise threatened; and 
(b) The cost of the personal safety equipment is comparable to the cost of 
similar personal safety equipment that is available for purchase by the 
public.177 
In a further attempt to ameliorate the possibility for abuse, Illinois law includes a 
clear temporal restriction to its emergency exception to competitive procurement. 
Specifically, it provides that “the term of the emergency purchase shall be limited to the 
time reasonably needed for a competitive procurement, not to exceed 90 calendar 
days.”178 It allows for that contract to exceed the 90-day limit “if the chief procurement 
officer determines additional time is necessary” and the “contract scope and duration are 
limited to the emergency.”179 Rhode Island uses the term “immediate response to the 
dysfunctional emergency” in its limitation of the emergency “no bid” procurement, and 
expressly prohibits any contract beyond that “immediate response,” specifically stating 
that any commitments beyond the “immediate restoration of function” must be 
competitively procured.180 Mississippi law limits the term of an emergency contract to no 
longer than one year.181 
Even with this language, though, procurement officials have much discretion in 
utilizing exceptions to competitive procurement. For example, Kansas law allows for an 
exception to competition when “in the judgment of the director of purchases and the head 
of the acquiring state agency, not seeking competitive bids is in the best interest of the 
state.”182 Also, Mississippi includes in its definition of “emergency” the very general set 
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of circumstances “when the delay incident to obtaining competitive bids could cause 
adverse impact upon the governing authority or agency, its employees or citizens.”183 It 
is, thus, obvious how the application of such catchall statutory language triggers 
transparency concerns as it allows for an arguably arbitrary justification of what is in the 
best interest of the state based solely on that which is presented by the head procurement 
official(s). Florida law lays bare the “on the books” commitment to transparency, but the 
concomitant opportunity for abuse when in a real-time emergency situation. It provides 
the protocol for utilizing the emergency exception and sets forth the following, in 
pertinent part: 
(a) The agency head determines in writing that an immediate danger to the 
public health, safety, or welfare or other substantial loss to the state 
requires emergency action. After the agency head signs such a written 
determination, the agency may proceed with the procurement of 
commodities or contractual services necessitated by the immediate danger, 
without receiving competitive sealed bids, competitive sealed proposals, 
or competitive sealed replies. However, the emergency procurement shall 
be made by obtaining pricing information from at least two prospective 
vendors, which must be retained in the contract file, unless the agency 
determines in writing that the time required to obtain pricing information 
will increase the immediate danger to the public health, safety, or welfare 
or other substantial loss to the state. The agency shall furnish copies of all 
written determinations and any other documents relating to the emergency 
action to the department. A copy of the written statement shall be 
furnished to the Chief Financial Officer with the voucher authorizing 
payment.184 However, the Governor’s order, under its emergency 
management powers may waive even the obligation to comply with 
emergency procurement procedures.185  
It becomes clear by these discretionary exceptions that it is in these “no-bid” rapid 
emergency procurement situations that the aforesaid price-inflation, corruption, bribery 
and fraud vulnerabilities can occur, especially when these residual provisions provide for 
catchall deviations from competitive procurement, which permits any “best interest of the 
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state” reason that “could have” an adverse impact on the state as an acceptable 
justification. Other residual provisions provide for even further opportunities for deviance 
when they allow for additional exceptions from competitive procurement law based upon 
“contrary language contained by local home rule charter” or as “approved by county 
ordinance.”186  
Resorting to these exceptions could not only lead to contracts with either an 
official’s “preferred” vendor or whoever is available in an emergency, it can also result in 
the creation of Gotham’s “vendor opportunism” situation.187 Girth agrees, describing 
such a situation as that in which “contractors take advantage of their position as a 
preferred provider, recognizing the government is compromised in its ability to replace 
that contractor.”188 In the face of a contractor’s failure to perform, “the government can 
be held hostage, unable to sanction (and therefore harm their only provider) and unable to 
maintain contract accountability.”189 As an additional matter, it warrants mentioning here 
that in a federally-declared emergency situation, FEMA reimbursement rules require that 
contracts with private vendors must be cost-controlled, cost-effective and competitively 
procured, which supports the agency’s commitment to public transparency.190 As such, 
rampant overuse of the “no-bid” emergency exception as a substitute for “pre-disaster” 
procurement planning can prohibit a jurisdiction’s ability to qualify for reimbursement 
from FEMA in the context of a federally-declared disaster. Preparation, planning and 
competitive bidding reduces the need for “no-bid” emergency purchases, thereby 
reducing the possibility for fraud and corruption.191  
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The concerns cited regarding privatization and “vendor opportunism” that could 
result from overuse of the “no-bid” emergency exception to competitive procurement can 
be ameliorated by a greater commitment to the competitive procurement procedure with 
the assistance of private-sector expertise. This expertise will not only allow for a more 
robust preparedness initiative, but a more thoughtful procurement process through which 
all reasonably foreseeable goods and services are timely procured and positioned prior to 
a disaster event. There must be accountability and oversight assurances governing this 
collaborative process, though, which can be confirmed through the execution of formal 
contractual agreements between the parties. 
D. FORMAL CONTRACTING AS AN ARGUABLE CURE TO 
PRIVATIZATION AND THE “NO-BID” EMERGENCY EXCEPTION 
CONCERNS 
Aside from the stated benefits that the private sector brings to bear in the 
emergency preparedness and management context, the research shows that it is the 
strength of the relationship between the public and private sectors that will dictate the 
effectiveness of their collaborative disaster preparedness and the success of their 
coordinated response and recovery efforts.192 But, the relationship cannot be built on 
trust alone; rather, “government contracting entails some level of tension between the 
contractor and the purchasing organization.”193 In fact, “absence of this tension and 
overreliance on trust can foster a situation in which the public manager reduces or 
neglects oversight duties, allowing the contractor to take advantage of the purchasing 
organization.”194  
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1. Formal Contracts as Mechanisms for Accountability 
Formalized negotiated contracts, executed prior to the crisis occurring, between 
governmental agencies and their private vendors that set forth performance objectives 
and responsibilities, as well as management and oversight responsibilities, ensure the 
balance of trust and tension between the parties. They further support the argument in 
favor of the increased role of the private sector in governmental functions, and undercut 
stated criticisms, as they ideally delineate “who is responsible for what” and they “ensure 
the accountability of public programs and the expenditure of public funds.”195  
Indeed, as reviewed in the context of a post-Katrina study of “what went wrong” 
published by the Public Administration Review, the authors determined that the lack of 
coordination in the Katrina response efforts was partly due to the lack of formal contracts 
with private vendors for the provision of necessary goods and services, which led to 
confusion as to with whom to work and who had the authority over such relationships 
during and after the hurricane.196 This ultimately led to the failure of those private 
partners to provide necessary supplies and services timely, if at all.197 Moreover, as 
confirmed by NASPO, establishing a contract with private vendors prior to a disaster 
“will help to ensure that the quality and level of support that will be required is clear and 
[will] help to establish pricing agreements in order to prevent price gouging during 
disasters.”198 This contractual relationship further strengthens the interdependency 
between the public and private sector.199 To be sure, “[i]f one partner does not perform 
its objectives in an interdependent relationship, the other is bound to fail as well.”200 
Therefore, to confirm that the necessary resources will be available in the event of a 
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disaster, it is preferable that those resources be secured by “agreed-upon rules and norms” 
(i.e., formal, written and, thus, enforceable, contractual agreements).201  
Some argue that informal agreements are more advantageous in order to foster 
flexible public-private collaborations in the face of a disaster, especially when rapid 
decisions need to be made.202 In fact, those same scholars argue that such informal 
agreements augment community resilience by allowing private partners to provide 
resources as the need occurs, rather than having a strict contractual “checklist” of terms 
and conditions.203 In fact, despite its criticism of the lack of “pre-disaster” contracts, the 
Public Administration Review’s post-Katrina study suggests that having stringent 
contractual requirements can actually hinder a response effort as such requirements can 
impede a response to unforeseen events.204 For example, if a jurisdiction’s emergency 
medical services department contracts with a private vendor for certain emergency 
medical supplies and then, during the disaster, it is discovered that additional supplies are 
needed that were not included in the original contract, its terms need to be flexible 
enough to allow for the addition of those supplies.  
Consider also the situation in which there is no written contract, only an informal 
agreement, and the private contractor simply pulls out of its “obligation” to provide 
certain emergency services during a disaster response effort. A government is left with 
even further decreased resources to fill ever-increasing citizen needs. Prager describes 
this exact situation in his article “Contracting Out Government Services: Lessons from 
the Private Sector,” in which he puts forth the example of contracting out emergency 
hospital services: “[i]f the staff pulls out, the community is left in the lurch.”205 Prager 
actually recommends parceling out the contract in favor of a number of private providers, 
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thus providing alternatives in case of a failure.206 Prager’s recommendation supports the 
case for multi-award as well as cooperative purchasing contracts. While many states have 
legislated that such contracts should only be awarded to the minimum number of 
contractors as necessary to meet the need,207 the possible danger(s) that could occur 
should a party pull out of an interdependent relationship without a contract for the other 
party to legally enforce highlights their advantages. 
This argument is valid and identifies an actual problem in the event unanticipated 
goods and services become necessary that were not a part of the bid or included in the 
contractual agreement’s scope of work. But, such flexibility does not have to come at the 
expense of a formalized written contract. The contract can be structured in such a way so 
as to provide a mechanism for the provision of certain additional emergency response 
supplies upon mutual agreement of the parties and set forth a protocol for the acquisition 
of same, in accordance with the applicable competitive procurement law and the 
contractual terms governing the protocol for amending the document. The District of 
Columbia has actually codified a potential gap-filling solution to this exact issue, which 
states that “[a] contract procured on an emergency basis shall not be modified to expand 
the scope or extend the time of the procurement unless a limited number of additional 
goods or services are needed to fill an on-going emergency requirement until regular 
procurement action procedures can be completed.”208  
Additionally, acknowledging that “disasters create dynamic changing 
environments,”209 as emergency managers identify potential needs for emergency 
response efforts, those managers can create bids or requests for proposals beforehand to 
secure contracts with vendors to essentially have them “on standby” in the event their 
goods and/or services are needed during or after a disaster. Prior disaster experience plays 
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a part here and emphasizes the importance of a preparedness planning initiative in which 
emergency managers identify needed resources based on previous disaster experiences 
and draw up “still need” lists based on those experiences.210 As referenced previously, 
Nebraska law has specifically contemplated such forecasting and statutorily encourages 
“[a]n analysis of past and potential disasters [and] emergencies” in order to identify “the 
functions and resources required to cope with such occurrences.”211 Such preparedness 
initiatives allow emergency contracts to include the purchase of as many reasonably 
foreseeable resources as possible, and have certain vendors “on standby,” thereby 
reducing the need to secure a contractor or amend a contract “mid-disaster.” Essentially, 
what may be lost in flexibility is gained in safeguarding against scandal, exploitation and 
fraud.212 
Some state agencies, like in California, utilize the shorter, more easily readable 
pre-formatted MOUs to engage emergency-related services from private vendors. In fact, 
Brubaker lists the many states that utilize the vendor-friendly MOU framework for 
disaster-specific goods and services, and specifically recognizes that California was one 
of the first to contract with a private vendor, namely, the California Grocers Association, 
which provided for a representative of that group to be present at the state EOC during a 
disaster to expedite the provision of food and water to citizens.213 It is important to note 
that while a MOU may be the most convenient option, and certainly preferable to no 
contract at all, it is still more of a general template and may not apply to every 
collaborative relationship with a government’s private partners. Thus, agencies must 
remain cognizant of their emergency needs and enter into properly negotiated contracts 
that meet those needs and are responsive to the unique or particular circumstances of each 
collaborative relationship. 
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Another possible solution is borrowed from the public sector’s on-going “team 
building” initiative.214 This initiative allows the parties to the collaboration to engage in 
recurring brainstorming, checklists, diagrams and other techniques by which the parties 
can account for the expected, as well as the unexpected, emergency-related needs, and 
put together a contractual framework that sets forth protocols to govern as much as is 
reasonably foreseeable.215 This initiative could also prove useful in anticipating and 
planning for contractual amendments that become necessary as a result of these activities 
that would prove beneficial when the actual emergency or disaster occurs. But, these 
contracts should not only be responsive to the reasonably foreseeable needs attendant an 
emergency situation, they should also account for the responsibilities of each of the 
parties in an effort to mitigate liability to the greatest extent possible. 
2. Formal Contracts as “Litigation Mitigation” 
To be sure, formal contracts are necessary to clearly outline each party’s 
responsibilities as to the coordinated disaster response effort contemplated by the 
agreement and, also, to ensure accountability in the provision of goods and equipment in 
accordance with the terms and conditions of the contract.216 As noted by Wilson and 
McCreight in their review of public emergency laws and regulations, “[e]mergency 
managers have enough to worry about without becoming legal experts on top of other 
tasks.”217 Moreover, according to Nicholson, “in spite of the fact that the law creates 
emergency management, in general the understanding of emergency managers and 
lawyers may be described as mutual ignorance. Some are not even aware that their 
activities are governed by both federal and state law.”218 Often times in the emergency 
management context, lawyers get called in after the business relationship has begun, to 
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“put out the fire.”219 But, if lawyers get called in at the beginning, to craft the contract to 
head off the “fire” as much as possible, all parties would be best served and, most 
importantly, the public would benefit from as seamless a contractual performance as 
possible, given the previously negotiated terms and conditions outlining the 
expectations.220 These “pre-disaster” contracts are, as Nicholson calls them, “litigation 
mitigation.”221  
Arguably, attorney involvement at the beginning of this process, and the resultant 
negotiations process that will inevitably follow, could delay the ultimate execution of the 
contract and the pre-positioning of the goods and/or services. But this possibility is all the 
more reason for emergency managers to use all available resources, from both the public 
and private sectors, to identify those reasonably foreseeable goods and services that may 
become necessary during an emergency event in enough time to allow for the contract 
negotiations process. Planning is the key here, as in all emergency management tasks. 
Indeed, just as emergency management professionals engage in planning activities to 
mitigate against the adverse effects of disasters as much as possible, so too must they 
engage in mitigation activities to limit liability in the face of those same disasters.222 
Formal contracts also allow the parties to expressly identify the management and 
oversight responsibilities of the various parties to the relationship. Essentially, private 
employees will be working for their private employer but to the ultimate benefit of the 
public agency with which that employer is contracting. As such, it is imperative to 
identify and contractually establish a mutually agreeable chain of command and 
management structure to guide the efficient provision of goods and services contemplated 
by the contract.223 Moreover, while a private partner may have the responsibility to 
provide certain goods or services, the public perception is that the government is 
ultimately responsible for emergency response and recovery; thus, the government must 
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have a legally enforceable means by which to confirm the accountability of its partners 
and be accountable to its constituents.224 As articulated by Busch and Givens in their 
review of public-private partnerships in disaster management, “when government 
understands that it can count on firms to provide government with goods or services 
during disasters, this enables government to focus on other strategic planning priorities, 
as it reduces the number of resource procurement decisions that the government must 
make in the midst of a crisis.”225 Additionally, clearly delineating the obligations of each 
of the parties obviates the possibility that government representatives will 
“micromanage” the private partner with which they are doing business, thereby 
increasing the private sector’s willingness to enter into contractual relationships with 
governmental entities.226 But, is contractual “confirmation” of responsibilities enough to 
ensure contractor performance in accordance with the terms and conditions of the 
contract? As set forth below, the research suggests that contractual measures alone will 
not assure such accountability. 
3. The Argument for the Most Effective Confirmation of Contractor 
Performance 
Commentators have suggested that the accountability benefits of a formalized 
contract may be overstated, arguing that the threat of contractually-imposed sanctions for 
failure to adhere to the agreed-upon protocols will not deter a contractor’s substandard 
performance or failure to perform.227 Moreover, they posit that it may be more costly for 
a governmental agency to enforce such contractual sanctions and, as a result, will simply 
opt to forego enforcing such provisions.228 Instead, they offer the counterargument that 
the known reliance of the public on a contractor’s promised services serves as a more 
effective guarantee of contract performance, as opposed to a contract and its negative 
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threat of sanctions.229 According to that logic, a contractor’s successful completion of its 
performance under a contract can lead to a favorable public relations “campaign” for the 
private vendor who provides effective emergency response supplies and services to the 
community (i.e., its “customers”) in an emergency situation.230 While a governmental 
agency will arguably bear the brunt of a poorly handled emergency response effort,231 in 
the opposite instance, the credit for a successful response effort will be publicly known 
and proper credit given, both to the public and private agencies responsible.232 Ideally, 
citizens will feel loyalty to and will patronize those private businesses who helped to 
revitalize their community, thus increasing the businesses’ sales. As Rakesh Bharania, 
Network Consulting Engineer for Cisco Systems, has stated, “[t]he private sector has…a 
vested interest in seeing the timely recovery of disaster-affected communities.”233 Izumi 
and Shaw agree, stating that a business’ contributions to a public agency’s emergency 
preparedness and response efforts “can be an important part of a business’ community 
investment initiatives.”234 Ideally, successful collaborative efforts will allow the private 
company to: 
• Protect its own business, value chain, customers, and staff 
• Build reputation and demonstrate good citizenship 
• Enhance government relationships 
• Influence stakeholder perceptions 
• Improve staff motivation and retention 
• Provide new business opportunities that create shared value235 
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But, there are disincentives for a private company to even choose to do business 
with the government in any context. One concern cited by the research against public-
private collaborations is the idea of transparency that is necessary for governmental 
agencies in their business operations. By agreeing to do business with the government, 
the private entities are essentially agreeing to open their books and business practices, to 
a certain extent, for public viewing. Busch and Givens, as well as Schaffer and 
Loveridge, point out that such transparency may put that private business at a 
disadvantage in the competitive business market if certain information, like its price 
points, is publicly disclosed for all to see and for competitors to under-bid.236 Busch and 
Givens also cite the financial disincentives for private firms in doing business with the 
government, given that it is based on a low-bid structure.237 Pongsiri  further cautions 
that private firms may be hesitant to enter into business relationships with governmental 
agencies if governmental regulation of private activities are not clearly defined and if the 
roles and responsibilities of each of the parties are not clearly defined, as private entities 
do not want to be micromanaged.238 On the other hand, Waddock, Bodwell and Graves, 
like Girth, Bharania, Kapucu, Arslan and Collins cited above, suggest that private firms 
may find that the positive public relations benefit of providing assistance to a community 
in times of disaster may supersede the concerns of the transparency issue as well as any 
negative financial effects of a low-bid pricing structure that are not offset by the 
production of more efficient products to meet governmental needs.239  
Arguments for or against increased privatization in the context of emergency 
management aside, the research is overwhelmingly clear that in the event such 
collaborations are implemented, they should be memorialized in a formal contract, so as 
to ensure the accountability of each of the parties to the greatest extent possible. Trust 
cannot solely be relied upon to confirm that the parties will do as they “promise.” The 
dynamic nature of an emergency event must be considered, to be sure. But, that should 
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not detract from the necessity of a legally binding document that protects both parties in a 
dynamic environment that requires performance in the event one fails to adhere to the 
agreed-upon terms and conditions of that contract. In fact, the dynamic nature of an 
emergency event is all the more reason for the private sector to fill a more important role, 
beyond that of a collaborator, in the overall emergency management enterprise. As set 
forth in the next section, the private sector should be a true partner with the government 
in all phases of its emergency management initiatives to create and implement more 
robust preparedness and management protocols. 
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V. THE PRIVATE SECTOR AS MORE THAN A 
COLLABORATOR; RATHER, AS A TRUE EMERGENCY 
MANAGEMENT PARTNER 
Emergency management is not just informal planning and then drawing up 
documents evidencing those plans; rather, it is the coordination of the overall strategy to 
manage identifiable risk and to oversee of the implementation of that strategy.240 At a 
time when governmental agencies continue to experience budgetary shortfalls while at 
the same time face the ever-increasing need and pressure to “successfully” protect their 
citizens from emergency events or “successfully” help their communities to recover from 
such events, a “whole of community” collaborative approach must be implemented for 
emergency management.241 Adler, Petty and Randall note the trend that the role of 
government is shifting from a “provider” of goods and services to one of an 
“administrator” or “manager” of contracts with private sources who provide those goods 
and services.242 
A. THE CROSS-DISCIPLINE CROSS-SECTOR APPROACH TO 
EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT 
Given the shifting trend of the government’s role in the provision of goods and 
services, especially in the context of emergency management, the question that 
necessarily arises is whether this managerial or administrative position should be with a 
government’s emergency management department, the procurement department or an 
emergency procurement consultant retained specifically for emergency/disaster 
contracting purposes. Adler, Petty and Randall advocate for an enhanced procurement 
office, stating that “procurement offices are ideally suited to lead strategic efforts related 
to state business transactions and supplier relationships.”243 They explain: 
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At times this may require procurement offices to contract…to augment 
knowledge gaps in existing staff. The role of internal procurement staff 
will broaden and become more valuable as they manage and tailor 
deliverables into a public contracting vehicle that optimizes outcomes for 
the state agency and complies with public procurement statutes.244  
Indeed, “[p]rocurement organizations that fulfill this role will transition from a reactive 
status using traditional transactional approaches to a more proactive strategy seeking 
system-oriented results that are designed to reduce costs in government operations, 
streamline processes and optimize contract outcomes.”245 
Klima and Jerolleman discuss an “all hands on deck” approach similar to that 
proposed above in the context of risk reduction, hazard mitigation and climate adaptation, 
but their recommendation is equally applicable here to support private-sector integration 
at the “pre-disaster” planning stage. Specifically, Klima and Jerolleman make the 
argument that, to be effective, natural hazard mitigation needs a more unified and 
coherent approach that involves a variety of disciplines, from both the public and private 
sectors, to ensure a “best practice” approach, as opposed to silo partnerships that often 
occur (i.e., architects working with city planners on building code issues and civil 
engineers working with local public officials to design drainage systems).246 They posit 
that the approaches of various disciplines to hazard mitigation allows for the recognition 
of all foreseeable risks as well as investment in “long-term community well-being.”247 
Indeed, “[s]uccessful hazard mitigation breaks the cycle of destruction, rebuilding, and 
destruction again.”248 Thus, by connecting the silo disciplines of emergency 
management, hazard mitigation and climate adaptation, real risk reduction can become 
actualized and resilience a reality.249 Likewise, connecting the private and public sector 
approaches to emergency preparedness and management can provide similar benefits. 
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In the planning stages of emergency preparedness, the NRF identifies as “critical” 
the development of “operational plans at the Federal level and in the states and territories 
that adequately identify critical objectives based on the planning requirements.”250 These 
plans include a “complete and integrated picture of the sequence and scope of the tasks to 
achieve the objectives,” which “are implementable within the time frame contemplated in 
the plan using available resources.”251 This calls for “creative thinking about resource 
shortfalls.”252 Kapucu and Hu state that horizontal emergency management 
collaborations, such as the public-private collaborations discussed here, allow for this 
creativity as well as greater flexibility in sharing ideas and resources.253 
Izumi and Shaw discuss a possible solution in the form of an informal “forum,” 
such as a chamber of commerce meeting or similar platform, pursuant to which private-
sector stakeholders can share experiences and knowledge with government and non-
government entities.254 Wild cites several examples of these collaborative forum-type 
initiatives, trainings and workshops that are being implemented in various states with 
positive results.255 She specifically cites an annual symposium in Tulsa, Oklahoma that 
features collaborative information sessions and workshops between local government and 
the business community, which provides a foundation for public-private collaborations to 
enhance emergency preparedness efforts.256 Kachgal also lauds Rhode Island’s 2014 
initiative in which the Providence Emergency Management Agency, the Rhode Island 
Emergency Management Agency and the Northeast Disaster Recovery Information X-
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Change formed the Rhode Island Business Alliance as a form of public-private 
commitment to enhance emergency response initiatives.257 
While these may be valuable moves forward toward better emergency 
preparedness and risk mitigation initiatives, this thesis suggests that more can be done, 
both on a nationwide and on a more formal basis. Specifically, this need can be filled by 
allowing the private sector to occupy a specific place and have a decisive voice on 
agencies’ emergency management committees and in the creation of agencies’ 
emergency preparedness and management plans. The NRF has specifically promulgated 
that “[d]uring an incident, key private sector partners should have a direct link to 
emergency managers and, in some cases, be involved in the decision making process.”258 
It follows, though, that private vendors must have knowledge of the region or locality that 
they are advising. Indeed, Schultz and Søreide make the additional argument that 
emergency corruption can be reduced through strengthening the internal procurement 
expertise of a particular procurement unit in the planning phase of emergency 
preparedness.259 This expertise is gained by knowing the relevant landscape and the 
beneficiaries of the goods and services.  
Private sector stakeholders can provide procurement units with this specialized 
knowledge because it is their business operations that are “out there” in the community. 
Their businesses depend on knowing their customers and anticipating their needs. Thus, 
as stated, depending on the level of the relevant agency, private stakeholders should be 
representative of the national, regional, statewide and local communities. Not only will 
governments benefit from the private sector’s supply chain expertise, as previously 
demonstrated, but also their local knowledge.260 Local companies know their region’s 
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unique risks and unique needs.261 Schultz and Søreide confirm, “corruption occurs 
because procurement specialists are ignorant of the local market dynamics, as well as 
cultural norms. Local staff should to the extent possible mirror the diversity of society at 
large.”262 This will translate into well-researched, competitively procured emergency-
related contracts that will truly make the “no-bid” emergency exception a procurement 
method of last resort. 
As another example of a way to more formally collaborate with the private sector, 
Bartle and Korosec support a concept posited by NASPO (i.e., that of the “problem-
oriented bid”), which essentially puts forth an emergency preparedness or management-
related problem or issue to private vendors, and then allows the bid responses to 
encompass the vendors’ respective suggested solutions.263 While Bartle and Korosec 
discuss this concept in the specific context of information technology services, and 
acknowledge that certain states do allow for this process as a cost-saving measure, this 
concept could potentially prove advantageous in the emergency preparedness context. 
Specifically, state agencies would advertise an emergency-oriented bid to solicit a 
solution to a specific emergency-related issue. The “best” (i.e., the most cost-efficient) 
solution would then be implemented by emergency managers and, ultimately, by 
procurement officials in the solicitation and execution of emergency-related contracts. 
Izumi and Shaw specifically endorse the private sector’s potential as a “solution 
provider” by not only “developing innovative new products” that contribute to disaster 
risk reduction, but also by participating in the management of the projects utilizing those 
products.264  
While this thesis stands for the proposition that any private-sector solicitation 
should be competitively procured to ensure transparency and “best value” to the 
government, it is interesting to note that certain states, such as Alabama, do not require 
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competitive bidding for “[c]ontractual services and purchases of products related to, or 
having an impact upon, security plans, procedures, assessments, measures, or systems, or 
the security or safety of persons, structures, facilities, or infrastructures.”265 Public 
officials should be wary of overutilizing such provisions to accomplish the above-stated 
goals as such would trigger the exact transparency concerns this thesis has highlighted as 
an inevitable pitfall to the “no-bid” emergency procurement exception. Notwithstanding 
the method of retaining private partners, though, this discussion lends credence for the 
stated position that state governments, and their legislatures, as discussed more fully in 
the next section, recognize the advantageous benefits of private-sector collaborations in 
the context of emergency management.  
B. THE EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND THE 
EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT PARTNER CONCEPT 
A review of the states’ emergency management laws reveals statutory support for 
the realization of private sector-assisted emergency preparedness and management plans. 
Among the most representative of these laws is Idaho’s State Disaster Preparedness Act, 
which authorizes its emergency management bureau to “participate in the development 
and revision of local and intergovernmental disaster plans.”266 Idaho law specifically 
provides that “[i]n preparing and maintaining the state disaster plan, the bureau shall seek 
the advice and assistance of local government, business, labor, industry, agriculture, 
civic, and volunteer organizations and community leaders.”267 Idaho further allows its 
bureau to “employ or otherwise secure the services of professional and technical 
personnel to provide expert assistance to political subdivisions, their disaster agencies, 
and intergovernmental planning and disaster agencies.”268  
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Arkansas’ Emergency Management Law specifically contemplates integrating the 
private sector to achieve its stated purpose, mandating that the Emergency Management 
Department “shall employ or otherwise secure the services of professional and technical 
personnel capable of providing expert assistance to political subdivisions, their local 
offices of emergency management, interjurisdictional planning, and interjurisdictional 
offices of emergency management.”269 Likewise, the Illinois Emergency Management 
Agency encourages the formation of an emergency management advisory committee, 
which includes both public and private-sector representatives with expertise in all phases 
of emergency management.270 Delaware’s Emergency Management Agency is 
legislatively “authorized and directed” to “procure by contract or agency such consulting, 
research, technical and other services as are necessary for it to carry out its 
responsibilities under the plan.”271 Kentucky similarly mandates “coordination of all 
disaster and emergency response by and between [public agencies and]…private 
organizations or private-sector companies dealing with disaster and emergency 
response.”272 Likewise, Nebraska law requires its Emergency Management Agency to 
seek the advice of the private sector in the preparation of its emergency operations 
plans.273 Also, Nevada law proscribes the development of comprehensive emergency 
preparedness and management plans “using the partnership of governmental entities, 
business and industry, volunteer organizations and other interested persons, for the 
mitigation of, preparation for, response to and recovery from emergencies or 
disasters.”274 
In a slightly different, but possibly more forward-thinking context, Mississippi’s 
Emergency Management Agency is charged with “[a]nticipat[ing] trends and promot[ing] 
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272 Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §39A.050 (West, Westlaw through the end of the 2015 regular session). 
273 Neb. Rev. Stat. §81-829.41(4). 
274 2015 Nevada Laws Ch. 69 (A.B. 90) (West, Westlaw approved by the Governor May 14, 2015). 
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innovations that will enhance the emergency management system.”275 California 
supports this trend as well, allowing its emergency management office to: 
Conduct outreach programs to encourage business to work with 
governments and community associations to better prepare the community 
and their employees to survive and recover from disasters[,][and] 
Develop programs so that businesses and government can work 
cooperatively to advance technology that will protect the public during 
disasters.276 
Relevant Montana law features language which declares that it is necessary to 
“reduce vulnerability of people and communities of this state to damage, injury, and loss 
of life and property resulting from natural or human-caused disasters” and to “provide a 
setting conducive to the rapid and orderly start of restoration and rehabilitation of persons 
and property affected by disasters.”277 That language coupled with Mississippi’s and 
California’s anticipatory language realistically supports the argument that there is a 
national appetite for private-sector preparedness collaborations to the fullest extent 
possible, especially in the context of cutting-edge innovation and innovative 
technologies.  
This representative review of the existing statutory language provides support for 
the argument that the states generally allow for the possibility of the private sector to be 
more involved in emergency management from the initial planning stages. As 
demonstrated, the private sector has access to resources and cutting-edge technology that 
are not otherwise available to governmental agencies, and can integrate its resource-based 
knowledge in that regard to enhance public emergency management plans.278  
                                                 
275 Miss. Code Ann. §33-15-14(2)(g) (West, Westlaw through the End of the 2015 Regular Session). 
276 Cal. Gov’t. Code §8588.1(c)(2), (4). 
277 Mont. Code Ann. §10-3-101(2)-(3) (West, Westlaw through the 2015 session). 
278 Izumi and Shaw, “Overview and Introduction of the Private Sector’s Role in Disaster 
Management,” 4 (stating that the private sector can contribute to disaster risk reduction through displaying 
an “increased focus on innovations that respond to new demands and societal needs.”). 
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VI. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
Based on the research conducted in connection with this thesis project, three 
distinct policy recommendations have been developed which are designed to guide 
emergency managers, procurement officials, attorneys for state and local governments, 
legislators and policymakers in the consideration of whether and how to enhance their 
respective jurisdictions’ emergency management statutory or policy framework. These 
recommendations are based on the totality of the academic literature reviewed in addition 
to the various state procurement and emergency management laws currently in effect. 
The following recommendations may be integrated in whole, or in a piecemeal fashion, 
depending on the desire of the considering jurisdiction to enhance its public-private 
collaborative practices, to the extent it is not already doing so to its greatest advantage, as 
well as on the political and legal feasibility of such integration.  
A. THE PRIVATE SECTOR AS A TRUE PARTNER IN EMERGENCY 
MANAGEMENT 
The research reviewed and cited in this thesis is overwhelmingly clear in its 
message that emergency management is more than just a group of public officials sitting 
down at a table and hammering out a planning document. Rather, a successful emergency 
response effort is based on a “solid, vibrant, and holistic emergency management 
program” that coordinates an overarching strategy on identifying, assessing and 
managing risk, and that utilizes the input of the “whole community,” public and private 
partners alike.279 Accordingly, there must be a seat, if not a collection of seats, at the 
emergency management committee “table” for private-sector representatives, who will 
then have a decisive voice in the creation and implementation of that agency’s emergency 
management plans. This thesis has focused on state law and state agencies; however, 
these “tables” should be integrated at all levels of government to achieve maximum 
collaboration for the greatest benefit to the general public. Involving local businesses 
with local knowledge in the local emergency planning context would better inform the 
                                                 
279 Urby and McEntire, “Applying Public Administration in Emergency Management,” 39–40, 42, 44.  
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local procurement process in terms of identifying the unique needs of a particular 
community during an emergency and entering into contracts for those unique needs. At 
the state level, private-sector representatives would ideally possess not only the 
knowledge regarding a particular state’s needs, but also the large-scale business 
continuity and supply chain expertise that would inform a statewide emergency 
management and response initiative.  
To ensure the utmost transparency in the process of securing the services of these 
private representatives, and to enhance the public’s trust in the process, it is most 
reasonable that this general policy be implemented through the competitive procurement 
process (i.e., through a request for professional services). Unlike a straight bid process, 
where price is the determinative factor, this thesis suggests that a combination of factors 
should be considered when selecting the private-sector committee members, such as 
those listed for South Carolina’s “Competitive Best Value Bidding” law:  
• The cost proposed by the private vendor  
• Quality of the service proposed and/or the vendor’s technical competency 
• Consistency and/or preferred direction of the proposed solution when 
considered with the state’s currently existing emergency management 
planning documents and/or the state’s currently existing strategic plan 
• Quality and effectiveness of the business solution and proposed approach 
• Industry and program experience 
• Prior record of vendor performance 
• Vendor expertise with projects of similar scope and complexity 
• Proven development methodologies and tools 
• Innovative use of current technologies and quality results280 
An issue arises with regard to the disciplines from which such representatives 
should be sought. As stated previously, while the majority of states allow for multi-award 
                                                 
280 S.C. Code Ann. §11-35-1528 (West, Westlaw through End of 2015 Reg. Sess.). 
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contracts, some local jurisdictions do not.281 Accordingly, to the extent that local 
governments choose not to amend their governing procurement rules to allow for these 
multi-award contracts, or it is not feasible to do so, it is recommended that sector-specific 
requests be written and solicited in order to avoid violations of the law. While certain 
agencies may have certain needs for particular sectors to be included on the emergency 
management committee, this thesis suggests that some of the more notable for 
consideration and inclusion are those representatives from the industries of information 
technology, innovation and/or innovative technologies, emergency management, grocers’ 
associations, business continuity and supply chain management.  
B. THE EMERGENCY “NO-BID” EXCEPTION AS A TRUE 
PROCUREMENT METHOD OF LAST RESORT 
While this thesis has criticized the use of the “no-bid” emergency exception 
present in the competitive procurement rules governing state procurement bodies, it is 
also cognizant of its value, but only as a procurement method of last resort. The 
reasoning underlying this statement is based on the hypothesis generated by the research 
reviewed and cited, which suggests that by implementing a more robust emergency 
preparedness and management initiative through public-private collaborations, 
governmental agencies will be able to forecast with a great deal of precision the goods 
and services that will become necessary during and after a disaster or emergency event. 
They will then be able to put into place, through the proper competitive procurement 
mechanisms, the necessary (and negotiated) contracts with selected vendors to provide 
those services when they are needed. By working with private-sector representatives to 
develop a proactive overarching emergency management plan, emergency management 
committees will be able to engage in the competitive procurement process early enough 
to allow for the necessary time delays for advertisement, response, negotiation and 
finalization of all contract documents, which will ultimately limit the need for resorting to 
the emergency exception.  
                                                 
281 City of New Orleans, Chief Administrative Office, Policy Memorandum No. 24(R) – Services and 




Admittedly, the process of putting together the emergency management 
committee, creating the proactive plan referenced above, implementing its objectives 
with regard to competitive procurement, and advertising for and entering into contracts 
with vendors for the identified goods and services is not an initiative that is able to be 
solidified and implemented in the short-term. Disasters and emergencies will inevitably 
occur that will fall under the previous methods of governmental operations. But, 
beginning the implementation of the proposed structure now, prior to an incident or 
crisis, will allow for better preparedness and response for future disasters and 
emergencies, both natural and man-made. Utilizing all resources available to investigate 
what is needed to effectively respond to an emergency event, and then to act on the 
results of that investigation will obviate an overreliance on the “no-bid” emergency 
exception, reduce the potential for economic waste, fraud and exploitation, and truly 
make the “no-bid” emergency exception a procurement method of last resort.  
C. AN EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT POLICY THAT EXPLICITLY 
INTEGRATES THE PRIVATE SECTOR 
In order to encourage the implementation of the policy recommendations 
contained in this chapter, the states’ respective emergency management policies and/or 
governing laws should be reviewed and potentially revised to more explicitly encourage 
collaboration with the private sector and recognize the benefits such collaborations would 
bring to the general public. Below are the recommended provisions for consideration, 
which are based on an amalgamation of the states’ emergency management laws 
reviewed and identified as the most advantageous for such public-private collaborations. 
This policy may be adopted in whole or in part, either legislatively or as a policy 
statement by an agency. This policy is by no means intended to be exhaustive, but is 
rather solely based on the research conducted in connection with this work. The goal is 
simply to enable an agency to enhance its emergency preparedness and management 
initiatives, to the extent such enhancement is needed, by that method which is desired and 
feasible.  
• General Statement: This state/city/political subdivision/agency can only 
be truly prepared for the next disaster or emergency if the public and the 
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private sector collaborate.282 As such, it is expressly encouraged that all 
governmental agencies include representatives of private businesses in 
their emergency preparedness and management initiatives and also 
integrate private-sector emergency preparedness and management 
measures into their disaster or emergency planning programs, workshops, 
training and exercises to the maximum extent possible in accordance with 
applicable law.283 
• Private-Sector Representation on the Emergency Management Committee: 
In addition to the governmental representatives on this state/city/political 
subdivision/agency’s emergency management committee, the 
corresponding procurement unit shall be charged with the procurement of 
the services of private-sector professional and technical personnel to 
provide expert advice, assistance, consulting and/or research services to 
the emergency management committee(s) for the agency requesting such 
services for the anticipation and identification of necessary emergency-
related goods and services as well as trends, innovations and innovative 
technologies that will enhance the emergency preparedness and 
management plans and risk assessments of the requesting agency.284 Such 
private-sector representatives shall also be selected for the express purpose 
of providing expert advice, assistance and related consulting services in 
connection with the preparation, maintenance and implementation of the 
requesting agency’s comprehensive disaster or emergency preparedness 
and/or management plan(s), which address the emergency management 
phases of mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery.285 
• Information Technology/Innovation Representative: The requesting 
agency is expressly encouraged to solicit the professional services of a 
private-sector expert in information technology and/or technological 
innovation to be a part of its emergency management committee. 
Alternatively, the requesting agency is expressly encouraged to form an 
information technology/technological innovation sub-committee for its 
emergency management committee. The express purpose of this provision 
is to allow for the identification and application of those innovative 
technologies that the private sector has developed or is developing that can 
1) be reasonably and feasibly integrated into the agency’s emergency 
preparedness and management framework, and 2) be reasonably and 
feasibly integrated into developing programs, goods and/or services that 
will better prepare the general public for disasters and emergencies, 
                                                 
282 Cal. Gov’t. Code §8588.1. 
283 Ibid. 
284 Miss. Code Ann. §33-15-14(2)(g). 
285 Idaho Code Ann. §46-1006; Ark. Code Ann. §12-75-111(b)(2)(A); 20 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 3305/
5(e); Del. Code Ann. tit. 20, §3107(5); Nevada Laws Ch. 69 (A.B. 90). 
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whether natural or man-made, and that will better protect the general 
public during and after such disasters or emergencies.286 
• Inventory Sub-Committee: This state/city/political subdivision/agency 
shall form an emergency inventory sub-committee as part of its emergency 
management committee for the express purpose of keeping a real-time 
updated inventory of all emergency preparedness and management-related 
supplies, medicines, services, materials and equipment, as well as the 
contracts that provide for same, and be able to provide this information to 
the relevant procurement unit upon request to allow for the most effective 
pre-positioning of such supplies, medicines, services, materials and 
equipment in accordance with the applicable competitive procurement 
laws and guidelines.287 
• Plan to Allow for Competitive Procurement: The state/city/political 
subdivision/agency shall, in cooperation with the corresponding 
emergency management committee(s) and/or sub-committee(s) as well as 
the corresponding procurement unit, competitively procure the required 
emergency-related supplies, services, or major repair items in time to meet 
the disaster or emergency event.288 The emergency exception to 
competitive procurement shall only be used as a procurement method of 
last resort, and only after proper showing to the appropriate governmental 
representative that the failure to procure the necessary goods or services 
was not the result of the failure to adequately plan for such need.289 
• Testing Emergency Preparedness and/or Management Plans: The 
emergency management committee of this state/city/political subdivision/
agency shall test periodically, through training exercises, tabletop 
exercises or otherwise, in accordance with what is reasonable and feasible 
for the state/city/political subdivision/agency, the plans for emergency-
related operations to ensure that the listed tasks and action items of agency 
employees and representatives are implementable and coordinated, and to 
allow for revisions to the emergency operations protocol, if necessary.290 
                                                 
286 Cal. Gov’t. Code §8588.1. 
287 Ark. Code Ann. §12-75-111(a)(2),(7),(8). 
288 La. Admin. Code tit. 34, pt. V, §1109. 
289 Haw. Rev. Stat. §127A-12(b)(4); Fla. Stat. Ann. §252.35(g); La. Admin. Code tit. 34, pt. V, 
§1109. 
290 2015 Nevada Laws Ch. 69 (A.B. 90). 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
Increased public-private collaborations are necessary to ensure that as many 
necessary resources as possible are in place before a disaster to provide during and post-
disaster. To be the most effective, these collaborations must take place at the emergency 
preparedness stage to allow private-sector representatives to share their expertise, 
resources and innovative technologies with government representatives to allow for the 
creation of a more effective emergency management plan. Private-sector representatives 
will also be able to assist procurement agencies in the identification of all reasonably 
foreseeable emergency-related goods and services far enough in advance to allow for 
proper competitive procurement, and to avoid overuse of the “no-bid” emergency 
exception, which could render a jurisdiction vulnerable to inflated prices, exploitation 
and fraud. To ensure effective and beneficial collaborations, though, it is advisable that 
such partnerships be memorialized through formal written agreements instead of informal 
agreements. While flexibility is important, the need for accountability, especially in the 
face of potentially devastating disasters, outweighs the benefits that informal flexibility 
may provide.  
While state statutory laws governing procurement and emergency management 
generally support greater collaborations with the private sector in the emergency 
management context, they can also be enhanced to provide greater legislative support for 
these collaborations, to the extent there are no political or legal obstacles preventing such 
enhancement. Implementing the proposed policy, whether in whole or in part, will allow 
an agency to achieve maximum collaboration and to use all available resources to the 
greatest degree possible before the disaster occurs. Indeed, by focusing preparedness 
efforts on partnerships with the private sector, governmental agencies can provide 
effective emergency resources to their citizens and, in turn, foster community resilience. 
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